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Introduction: Why Ploesti?
On June 5th, 1942, the United States declared war on Romania. American troops
were nowhere near the southeastern European nation, nor would they ever have any
significant presence there. The decision was due solely to two factors: the doctrine and
equipment that had been developed by the United States Army Air Force (USAAF)
during the period between the two world wars, and the view that Allied planners had of
the importance of Romanian crude oil production to the German war economy. Romania
became a target for American military planners a mere seven months after Pearl Harbor
because of the technology of the four-engine heavy bomber, the uniquely American
concept of strategic bombing, and certain assumptions of the German economic system.
The amount of literature on the strategic bombing of occupied Europe is
voluminous. For the sake of simplicity, the existing historiography can be divided into
three general views. The first focuses on the heroism of the combat crews in the face of
impossible odds, an excellent illustration would be Steven Ambrose‟s The Wild Blue.
The second view is one that recognizes the intentions and heroic sacrifices of those
carrying out the bombing while also acknowledging that mistakes were made in the
course of the campaign. Prime examples would be Bombs, Cities, and Civilians by
Conrad C. Crane and Robert Pape‟s Bombing To Win. The third general conception is
one that focuses on the civilian tragedy and questions the real motives of air commanders
in no uncertain terms. Wings of Judgment by Ronald Shaffer exemplifies this line of
argument. This study does not look to solve or contribute to the moral and philosophical
questions that have bogged down the historiography of USAAF strategic bombing, but
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rather focuses on the soundness of the fundamental beliefs on which strategic bombing
missions in World War Two were based. The doctrine that inspired the USAAF‟s
campaign above Romania and the rest of occupied Europe was based on theory and
mathematical calculations that were in almost every respect removed from both practical
and strategic reality. The strategic bombing campaign during the war is best understood
as an attempt to align the hypothetical and much trumpeted destructive capabilities of air
power with the realities inherent in an active struggle against a dynamic, adaptable
enemy.
The various attacks upon the thirteen major oil refineries situated around the city
of Ploesti, Romania combine to form the perfect case study for analyzing the practical
application of U.S. strategic bombing doctrine by removing the variables of place and
target type from the equation. Ploesti is useful as a case study because it contained
industrial targets clearly distinguished from nearby population centers, all manner of antiaircraft defenses available were represented, and every conceivable means available to
achieve destruction of the target was employed by the Army Air Force. It is, in many
ways, a microcosm of the strategic bombing campaign over Europe. The historical
literature approaches the USAAF‟s missions over Ploesti in one of two ways. Either they
are viewed as a series of individual attacks that are interesting in and of themselves,
mainly due to the unique nature and costly attack of August 1st 1943, or they are
discussed only in their relation to the overall oil campaign. Therefore there exists a gap in
the literature for one to analyze the Ploesti raids collectively as a means by which to
determine the effectiveness of „precision‟ bombing.
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The purpose of this study is not to provide a narrative of the air raids on oil
refineries in the Ploesti area as there are previous works available that accomplish this
extraordinarily well. In any work of history a firm understanding of the story is required,
and it will be discussed as necessary. But the true focus of this paper is instead on the
development of an intellectual concept, its refinement, and its practical application as
allowed or restrained by the technology available at the time.1 The central themes of

1

In a desire to provide a more integrated approach the author consulted not only scholarly and public
works on the many bombings of the Ploesti area but also much time and energy was invested in
understanding and presenting the thought process behind and implications of doctrinal development during
the interwar period. Only by a marriage of the two is it possible to truly understand what occurred at
Ploesti. For insight into doctrinal development both Thomas H. Greer‟s The Development of Air Doctrine
in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 and Robert T. Finney‟s History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 19201940 are invaluable. These were supplemented by Stephen L. McFarland‟s America's Pursuit of Precision
Bombing, which provides wonderful insight into the technological developments necessary to even attempt
the concepts developed at the Air Corps Tactical School. “American Air Campaign Planning before Pearl
Harbor” by Mark Clodfetter painted a much broader picture, allowing one to easily see how early doctrinal
thought plugged into later theory. A central pillar of this theory is discussed by the person responsible for
it, Donald Wilson, in his article “Origin of a Theory for Air Strategy.” The doctrine developed at ACTS is
codified in AWPD/1 and AWPD/42. James C. Gaston‟s Planning the American Air War: Four Men and
Nine Days in 1941 provides a wonderfully vivid portrait of the men and circumstances involved in the
development of AWPD/1, and The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler by Haywood S. Hansell gives us a
firsthand account of the entire doctrinal process from embryonic beginnings to the war‟s conclusion. In
order to understand the value of USAAF strategic bombing doctrine and to properly analyze its effects a
firm grasp of the system upon which it was to be unleashed is vital. For this purpose, Burton H. Klein‟s
Germany’s Economic Preparations for War, Alan S. Milward‟s The German Economy at War, John
Gillingham‟s Industry and Politics in the Third Reich: Ruhr coal, Hitler, and Europe, and Adam Tooze‟s
The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi War Economy provided the framework.
This was supplemented with “The German War Economy” by Nicholas Kaldor and R.J. Overy‟s “Hitler‟s
War and the German Economy: A Reinterpretation.” In “The Importance of Energy in the First and
Second World Wars,” W.G. Jensen takes a focused look at the role of this resource, while Alfred C.
Mierzejewski convincingly bucks the established narrative in The Collapse of the German War Economy,
1944-1945: Allied Air Power and the German National Railway. R.L. Dinardo‟s “Horse-Drawn Transport
in the German Army” and Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism?: Horses and the German
Army of World War II complement Mierzejewski‟s view that oil was not the vital target system the Allies
thought. In a desire for a more thorough understanding of the German air defense situation the author
turned to The Luftwaffe Fighter Force: The View From the Cockpit by Adolf Galland and the phenomenal
work that is Edward B. Westerman‟s Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914-1945. For a more focused
look at the Ploesti campaign James Dugan and Carol Stewart‟s Ploesti: The Great Ground-Air Battle of 1
August 1943 and Leon Wolff‟s Low Level Mission provide a wonderful insight into that famous raid, while
Leroy W. Newby‟s Target Ploesti: View from a Bombsight and Jay A. Stout‟s Fortress Ploesti: The
Campaign to Destroy Hitler’s Oil focus on the 1944 campaign by the 15th Air Force. For an analysis of the
bombing, both then and now, the author looked to six different United States Strategic Bombing Survey
(USSBS) reports, Albert Speer‟s memoirs Inside the Third Reich, John F. Kreis‟ Piercing the Fog:
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conceptualization, development, societal acceptance, application, and evaluation hold
true in the development of all technologies; this study simply addresses these issues in a
military setting.
The United States‟ strategic bombing campaign in World War Two covered a
large amount of time, proceeded at various levels of intensity, and regularly shifted target
priorities. The many raids against Ploesti are ideal for the study of doctrinal application
due to the many attacks against the area, the many different types of attacks used, and the
single and continuous nature of the targeted system. The Ploesti raids, looked at
collectively, can in fact be construed as a doctrinal laboratory; when studied detached
from the broader picture it can be difficult to recognize an established bombardment
doctrine in practice.
Another benefit from studying the Ploesti campaign is the illumination of the
relationship between a rigid bureaucracy, the idea that brought about its establishment,
and the capability of both to adapt to a rapidly changing situation. The United States
Army Air Corps succeeded in selling its concept of strategic bombardment to both
military planners and civilian policymakers, and in order to implement this theory a vast
program of procurement and training was put into motion. This human and mechanical
juggernaut took on the form of a Roosevelt-era bureaucracy, and as a result several
Intelligence and Army Air Force Operations in World War II, Dwight D. Eisenhower‟s Crusade in Europe,
Henry Harley Arnold‟s Global Mission, and The War Reports of Gens. Marshall, Arnold, and King. An
extensive amount of archival material from the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama was used to understand the operations at Ploesti and the immediate
military analysis. Daylight Raids by the U.S. Eighth Air Force: Lessons Learned and Lingering Myths from
World War II by Frank Heilenday provided an insight into the positives and negatives of bombing, and of
course the venerable series The Army Air Forces in World War II by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea
Cate provided a firm foundation to return to when the author found himself lost, distracted, or too far out on
a limb.
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changes demanded by combat experience were not incorporated into the strategic
bombing system. After studying the disparity between what was expected to happen in
regards to strategic bombing before the war and what was possible at Ploesti one cannot
help but be more sympathetic to the plight of Yossarian in Joseph Heller‟s classic novel.
In fact, Catch-22 is an excellent illustration of the frustration that must have been felt by
bomb crews as they continually risked their lives attempting to force mathematical
calculations and theory into reality. This very real disconnect between what was actually
possible and what the established bureaucracy preached was possible is vividly apparent
when one looks at the Ploesti raids in their totality.
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Chapter 1: The Development of American Air
Power Doctrine
Since the Wright Brothers‟ first flight on December 17, 1903, the military
implications of aviation were ever in the minds of decision makers. There was no doubt
the airplane would have a role in modern military campaigns, the question was what that
role would be. This debate would be the cause of great tension and even open conflict
within both the military and civilian sectors. It was during the roughly two decades of the
interwar years that, by equal parts persuasion and subterfuge, American airmen refined a
unique concept of air power that was sold to the American public and politicians on the
eve of World War Two.
United States strategic bombing doctrine as developed between the world wars
consisted of four central tenets: 1) bombing was to be from high altitude, 2) it was to
destroy „precision‟ targets which would result in the collapse of the enemy‟s economic
structure, 3) it was to occur during daylight, 4) the bombers were to be self-defending.
Once exposed to prolonged combat it became obvious to many that number four was not
feasible without sustaining prohibitive losses, and both contemporaries and historians
have debated whether the second point was achieved or even possible. Therefore, only
50% of the USAAF‟s strategic bombing doctrine is 100% defensible. How was such a
concept developed? How were so many Americans, both those in the command structure
and those doing the actual flying and dying, convinced of its practicality?
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The Beginning
In order to fully understand the development of American strategic bombing
doctrine it is necessary to begin at the first large-scale military application of airpower,
World War One. During this conflict airpower was primarily used as an auxiliary to the
land forces; it filled the roles of reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and was used to
achieve and maintain air dominance over the field of battle. Though these were the
accepted roles of this new technology at the time, there were those who saw possibilities
beyond the immediate area of action. “Before the end of the war preparations were well
advanced for a fairly extensive air offensive by the Allies. Furthermore, the Americans
had developed a definite and thorough doctrine to support strategic bombardment.”2 This
was most succinctly stated in a document written by Lt. Col. Edgar S. Gorrell in his
position as leader of the Strategic Aviation Branch. Disregarding all activities in direct
support of the trenches as viable targets for bombardment, Gorrell looked to the
destruction of the enemy nation‟s productive capacity, which was supporting their
military, as the proper target and one that could effectively break the stalemate. General
Pershing fully approved the plan on January 5, 1918.3 The trench warfare of World War
One is important to keep in mind as the obsessive desire to ensure that such a situation
would not happen again provided the drive for almost all interwar doctrinal and
technological development.

2

Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941. (Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL.: USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955; Office of Air Force
History, U.S. Air Force, 1985), 10.
3
Mark Clodfetter. “American Air Campaign Planning before Pearl Harbor,” The Journal of Military
History, 58, no.1 (Jan., 1994): 76.
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Historian Thomas Greer clearly linked the work of Gorrell to what would follow
at the Air Corps‟ most advanced school. “The Gorrell plan was a truly striking forerunner
of the doctrine which matured years later in the Air Corps Tactical School.”4 This plan
also marks the beginning of the detachment of bombing doctrine from strategic and
practical reality. While the idea of destroying the economic foundation of the enemy,
resulting in their complete inability to wage modern war, sounds very efficient, was it
even possible to penetrate into the industrial heart of Germany with Handley Page 0/400s
and Vickers Vimys?5 Even if these aircraft managed to survive both enemy pursuit
aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery fire and reached their targets there was the matter of
actually landing the bombs on a critical point in the system to bring about sufficient
destruction so as to have an effect on the enemy‟s frontline combat troops. Gorrell‟s
successors attempted to address these issues. The end of World War One prevented a
combat test of Gorrell‟s theory, but the concept of bombing the production centers of
belligerent industrialized nations did not go away.
American air power advocate Brigadier General William Mitchell, “generally
regarded as the American counterpart of the RAF‟s Trenchard and the Italian Douhet,”6
took three very important lessons from his experience in World War One. The first was
that the nature of air power was one of flexibility and mobility; to tie it to slow and
immobile ground armies was to surrender its greatest strength. Also, and this would be a

4

Greer, 11.
The HP 0/400 had a max range of 450 miles, a 8,500 feet ceiling, 76 mph max speed and a maximum
bomb load of 2,000 lbs, while the Vimy managed to improve on the Handley Page in many respects with a
910 mile max range, 7,000 foot ceiling, 103 mph top speed and 4,800 lb bomb load. (Robert Jackson. The
Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft. (Bath, UK: Parragon, 2006), 183, 363.)
6
Greer, 17.
5
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key point for later theorists, air power should not be diffused amongst the various
commanders but rather amassed in a single striking force to allow for its concentrated
application. Third, since air power was to be concentrated, only officers within the air
service could possibly understand its potential and apply such a force properly. These
beliefs all went against the established air organization during World War One, where
individual commanders had control of the air resources within their theater of
operations.7 This would become a fundamental point in the interwar struggle. “The
question of the organization of the air arm became inextricably interwoven with the
question of deployment.”8
The effects of the interwar period upon the psyche of airmen cannot be overstated,
and much would be learned in respect to public relations. “From 1919 to 1939 the history
of the Army air arm was dominated by a struggle for recognition which left a deep
imprint upon the air organization and its personnel.”9 At first the struggle was for air
independence, and when that could not be achieved the goal shifted to partial autonomy
within the Army. Numerous bills, boards, and committees came into existence during this
time, all seeking to address the question of where aviation would fit within the existing
military structure, and always there was Mitchell and his disciples calling for separation

7

There were two exceptions to this, as at St.-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Mitchell was able to wrest control
of available aircraft and apply this combined force on the battlefield to great effect. (Robert T. Finney,
History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-1940. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.: USAF Historical
Division, Research Studies Institute, USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1955; Air Force History
and Museums Program, 1998), 3.)
8
Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-1940. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.:
USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1955; Air
Force History and Museums Program, 1998), 5.
9
Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces in World War II Vol I.
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 17.
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from the backward thinking and dogmatically-entrenched Army. The question of military
organization became such a hotbed issue that “between 1926 and 1935 twelve bills for a
Department of Aeronautics and seventeen for a single Department of Defense were
presented in Congress.”10 This does not include the plethora of „definitive‟ boards
established to analyze the matter, such as the Menoher Board in 1919, the Morrow Board
in 1925, or the Baker Board in 1934. The repeated exercise of testifying before a
committee and having the proceedings reported in the following day‟s paper allowed the
aviation „rebels‟ to learn exactly what policymakers and the public would accept and
reject in regards to the organization and proper use of air power. For instance, it was
through this public discussion that it became obvious that Americans had no desire to
partake in the indiscriminate bombing of population centers and airmen adjusted their
doctrine (at least the public utterances of it) to accommodate public demand. “This
ethical concern of the American people was largely responsible, also, for the
development of the idea of precision bombing as opposed to mass attacks. An openly
advocated program of mass bombardment would have found virtually no support in the
United States.”11
It was during this period of institutional uncertainty that the Air Service Tactical
School was established in 1920 at Langley Field in Virginia. The school was renamed the
Air Corp Tactical School (ACTS)12 and moved to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama in
1931. It was there that Gorrell‟s theory would be refined and crystallized over the next
10

Ibid., 29.
Greer, 15. (Underlined by the author for emphasis.)
12
The name change was a result of the Air Corps Act of July 2, 1926, which provided for minimal
reorganization.
11
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decade. The influence of ACTS would be acutely felt in the next world war, as the school
“would graduate 261 of the 320 generals serving in the Army Air Forces at the end of
World War II.”13 The school served as a collection point for those interested not only in
the proven capabilities of air power but also its possibilities. “In 1929 the Tactical School
adopted as its motto: Proficimus More Irretenti. (We Make Progress Unhindered by
Custom).”14 Though still officially chained to the Army‟s doctrine for the use of air
power, the atmosphere at ACTS was always one of pushing boundaries and its existence
would be characterized by radical intellectual theory coupled with conflicting official
pronouncements.
An illustration of this duality can be seen in the bombing tests upon naval vessels
engineered by Mitchell in the early 1920s. In July 1921 the captured German battleships
Frankfurt and Ostfriesland were successfully sunk, followed by the aging American
cruisers the Virginia and New Jersey in September 1923. Though much was made of
these displays at the expense of the Navy, “there was, however, nothing especially
profound about aircraft dropping hundreds of bombs to sink immobile ships unprotected
by antiaircraft artillery.”15 At their core these tests were an attempt to wrestle funds for
the expansion of military aviation, but they also provided a publicly accepted argument
for such investment in a purely offensive weapon. It was decided that military aviation
would be sold by the advocates of air power to the public and congressional leaders as a
defensive weapon, one which could defend the coasts as well as, if not better than, the
13

Clodfetter, 83.
Finney. vii.
15
Stephen L. McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing. (Washington: Smithsonian Institute
Press, 1995), 47.
14
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existing Navy. Due to economic considerations and the strong aversion to aggressive
conflict during this period, the only hope of receiving any funding at all was in the name
of defense. The fact that first two and then four engine bombers were even able to be
discussed within a defensive context speaks volumes to the insight and wizardry of
airmen at the time.
The focus in the 1920s on the proper organization of air power and use of force
can be seen in the Air Service Tactical School‟s 1926 text Bombardment. While not
going too far beyond the party line in regards to the use of military aviation in the field, it
did push to codify the principle of massed force. It argued that bombardment aviation “is
seldom, if ever, allotted to a group of armies. Such an allotment would be in violation of
one of the fundamental principles of bombardment employment.”16 The text also
recognized the reality that one mission would not suffice to knock out a target. “It is
apparent that complete destruction by bombardment is to be accomplished only by
concentrated and continuous operations.”17 If you cannot bomb continuously, should you
then bomb at all? If you cannot ensure the destruction of the target then you have
sacrificed men and planes needlessly and alerted the enemy to your intentions. This
practical concept of continuous operations would be lost during the 1930s and the
slightest resemblance of it would not come into use over Ploesti until 1944.
Unfortunately for the historian, Bombardment cannot be taken at face value. One
must remember that the true philosophy of air men differed widely from what was
accepted within the Army. After the 1925 court-martial of Gen. Mitchell, and his
16
17

United States. Air Corps Tactical School. Bombardment. (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1926), 1.
Ibid., 3. (Underlined by author for emphasis.)
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subsequent early retirement in 1926, this philosophy did not wither and die but instead
was removed to private conversations while the public dialogue conformed to accepted
thought. This makes it very difficult for the historian who must therefore read between
the lines and always take official Air Corps statements with a large grain of salt. Wesley
Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, in Volume I of their seminal work, The Army Air
Forces in World War II, summed up the situation beautifully:

So it was that the training guides, as textbooks for young officers, were
not only dull in the inimitable style of Army manuals; on controversial
issues they were at best noncommittal and at worst misleading. And
hence, paradoxically, we must seek the air arm‟s underlying philosophy of
warfare not in the official pronouncements but first in the public
utterances of its radicals and later in the less widely disseminated thought
of its most advanced school. This approach is not wholly satisfactory, but
it is the only way to explain, other than by supporting a sudden reversal of
opinion, the emergence shortly before World War II of a well-developed
theory of warfare in which strategic bombardment played the predominant
role. In its most essential features this theory was evolved by Mitchell in
the mid-twenties; by 1939 it had become an article of faith privately held
if not publicly proclaimed by the Air Corps.18
Of the four central tenets of bombardment discussed earlier, every one of them can be
traced to the Tactical School, and the genesis and acceptance of each raises questions.

The Influence of the Air Corp Tactical School
It is impossible to point to one instructor at ACTS who was responsible for the
entirety of the bombardment doctrine that developed over the 1930s. The process was in
many ways a synthesis of ideas, a type of group think that evolved slowly into something
18

Craven and Cate, vol. 1, 35. (Underlined by author for emphasis.)
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that one would recognize as a cohesive theory.19 One of the reasons for this was the
circular flow of knowledge within the school; students became instructors and passed
down theory as fact. “By the mid-thirties…of the 17 Air Corps officers on duty at the
school, 16 were graduates of ACTS…”20 Couple this with the freedom inherent in the
distance between Alabama and Washington D.C. and it becomes understandable why
something so different from established thought would be born and nurtured at the Air
Corps Tactical School. Though it is not easy to pierce through this developmental fog,
there are certain instructors who contributed vital pieces to the overall whole.
According to Dr. Stephen McFarland, Lieutenant Kenneth Walker is most
responsible for the decision to bomb at high altitudes. During tests at the Aberdeen
Proving Grounds between July and November of 1931, the curious phenomenon of
bomb-skipping was discovered and studied intently. “If they landed on hard surfaces, the
bombs tended to roll, skid, or tumble an average of 141 feet in range and 25 feet in
deflection. The small angle of impact made fuses more liable to fail. Bombs tended to
detonate on their sides, reducing the effects of both the explosion and resulting
fragmentation.”21 One must wonder if the planners of the 1943 low-level raid on Ploesti
were aware of this study or if anyone protested based on this study‟s findings. Gravity
allowed bombs to bury before explosion and in order for this to occur time was needed;
time that was only made available if bombing altitude was increased. “The inability to

19

The development of doctrine at ACTS would make for a very interesting study of group psychology.
Finney, 23.
21
McFarland, 86.
20
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produce the mining effect for a low-altitude release, however, reduced the explosive
power of bombs by four and a half times.”22
Could a bomb dropped from high altitude actually hit a precision target? The
Norden M-I bombsight, though a remarkable development for its time, was not perfect.23
The first of these new bombsights reached the Army in April 1933 and required a steady
approach and clear weather over the target to be effective.24 Once again, Walker came to
the rescue and provided theoretical support for high-altitude bombardment. Using
probability in much the same way as the artillery corps, he formulated the amount of
aircraft needed, and hence bombs released, to hit the desired target. “But his next step
was unfortunately too simplistic. If the “single-shot probability” of obtaining a hit within
the area of a proposed target was, for instance, one in ten, he reasoned that one should
drop ten bombs to be sure of one hit. Of course, this wasn‟t so.”25 Getting bombs „on
target‟ would be a continuous issue during the war and the bombsight tests compiled in
the following table portray the difficulty in hitting a 100 x 100 foot „precision‟ target. 26 It
is important to remember that enemy defenses would force attack altitude and speed to be
much higher than those used during bombsight testing. There was still much room for
improving accuracy before America entered the war:

22

Ibid., 87.
For a wonderfully detailed account of the development of this bombsight, and the impact it had on
strategic thought, McFarland‟s America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing is a vital source.
24
Ibid., 76
25
Haywood S. Hansell, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta: Higgins-McArthur/ Longino & Porter,
1972), 16-17.
26
100 ft. x 100 ft. was the assumed target size used in probability calculations within AWPD/1, prepared in
1941. (Air War Planning Division. AWPD/1: Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces.
(Washington D.C.: War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, August 12, 1941. Air Force
Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112), Tab 3(b), 2.)
23
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In the six months before Pearl Harbor, bombardiers dropped nearly 50,000
bombs on practice targets. At an average speed of 170 mph and with no
drops from above 20,000 feet, not one group, on average, could achieve
the standards set in Training Manual 1-250 for first-, second-, or third
class bombardiers. This was in perfect weather against no enemy
defenses.27

28

Along with the matter of delivery came the question of what constituted a viable
target. As stated earlier, the bombing of non-combatants was looked upon with distain by
the American public. Throughout the 1930s there were examples of such attacks, the
Italian bombing of Ethiopia and the Condor Legion‟s bombing of Guernica were but two
of many, which only served to reinforce this notion in the United States. The concept of
directly attacking military targets along the front, through close air support and
interdiction missions, would more easily be facilitated by the commanders in the field
and airmen desperately wanted control of their own destinies. These two reasons helped
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the doctrine developed at ACTS to mirror Gorrell‟s from the previous war.
While Gorrell‟s reports were a matter of record, the primary intellectual
supporting argument, the industrial web theory, according to Donald Wilson, originated
in his courses at ACTS during the 1933-1934 term.29 In an article written in 1971 to
clarify doctrinal development, Wilson provides a stunning insight into the minds of air
planners. By looking at the United States as a blueprint for every industrialized nation,
the belief developed that only certain key points in the economic infrastructure would
have to be destroyed for the entire structure to collapse. These lynchpins, according to
Wilson, consisted of transportation, electric power, and steel production.30 These were
considered „precision‟ targets due to the fact that they were specific, well-defined, and
vital to the continuation of the enemy‟s war effort. In many respects the selection of
targets can be viewed as an inverse pyramid, with the belligerent nation as a whole being
the largest section on top. It was the goal of doctrinal developers at ACTS and later those
charged with target selection to determine the pieces of the economy that supported the
sections above them. Target priorities would change during the course of the war,
resulting in target systems not being subjected to the continuous attacks required to
ensure their destruction as discussed earlier in Bombardment. “As for the possibility of
repairing this devastation, it seemed obvious that any air force should be able to destroy
faster than repair or replacement could be effected.”31 The Germans, in many ways,
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invalidated this belief in assured destruction as they would many other assumptions
during actual operations.
Due to the nature of the targets selected it was recognized that night bombing
could not be the method adopted by the United States Army Air Force. It would be
difficult to pick out population centers in pitch black, let alone „precision‟ targets. “By
1932, the school had endorsed explicitly the concept of daylight bombardment.”32 One of
the primary advantages of night bombing was the perceived difficulty it gave the
defenders and hence the better survivability of the air crews. Wouldn‟t the planes flying
in broad daylight be sitting ducks for enemy anti-aircraft defenses, especially if the target
systems were known in advance? To counter this drawback in precision doctrine another
intellectual theory was developed, that of the „self-defending‟ or „invincible‟ bomber.
The belief that an air offensive was indefensible was not a new one. H.G. Wells‟
fictional representation of the next international conflict, War in the Air, was published a
mere five years after the Wright‟s flight and illustrates the terrifying position that this
new invention held in the public mind. A plethora of books on the subject followed
within the next twenty years, including one by Mitchell entitled Winged Defense. It was
not that there was no defense whatsoever against bombardment, pursuit aviation and antiaircraft artillery would continue to be improved throughout this period with the express
intention of negating the bombers, but it was the strengths of aviation, speed and freedom
of movement, that created the aura of invincibility. The crossing of the English Channel
by Louis Bleriot in 1909 had a profound effect on the British and forced them to
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reevaluate their concept of security in this new air age. The ideas first espoused by Wells
quickly moved from science fiction to science fact in the eyes of the public and made
their way upwards through the halls of policymakers and government officials. The fear
of the bomber has been forever enshrined in the famous statement by then Member of
Parliament Stanley Baldwin. “I think it is well for the man in the street to realize that
there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed, whatever people may
tell him. The bomber will always get through…”33
With this belief already prevalent it is understandable that the United States Army
Air Force would accept the corresponding notion, that their bombers would be able to
successfully bomb their targets regardless of enemy opposition. The major difference
between what was being discussed by everyone from reporters to politicians and those at
ACTS was the nature of the targets. If you are interested in indiscriminately bombing
your enemy you have a plethora of targets from which to chose from, in fact anywhere
within their borders, and such a vast number of possibilities would indeed be
indefensible. On the other hand, if you have a doctrine that lists certain industries as the
only acceptable targets due to a desired outcome then you provide the enemy the ability
to centralize their fighter and anti-aircraft artillery at defined targets, making the job of
the defender infinitely easier. If you then insist on making repeated attacks against such
heavily defended targets the situation has the potential to become both tragic and darkly
comical. Such a self-imposed target limitation, when combined with the newly developed
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technology of radar, would allow for a high level of defensive preparation before USAAF
attacks.
Craven and Cate looked to the effect of the coastal defense exercises of spring
1933 upon Brigadier General Westover, Assistant Chief of Air Corps, as a reason for the
incorporation of the invincible bomber theory into official USAAF doctrine. This was
primarily due to the technical advances in bombardment aviation as represented in the
Boeing B-9 and Martin B-10.

During these exercises, observation aviation appeared woefully obsolete in
performance, as did pursuit aviation in speed characteristics. Since new
bombardment aircraft possesses speed above two hundred miles per hour,
any intercepting or supporting aircraft must possess greater speed
characteristics if they are to perform their missions. In the case of pursuit
aviation, this increase of speed must be so great as to make it doubtful
whether pursuit aircraft can be efficiently or safely operated either
individually or in mass.34

These may be solid conclusions based on production models in 1933, but if there
is one constant about the aircraft industry during the twentieth century it is rapid
technological advancement. While the B-9, with a maximum speed of 186 mph and a
ceiling of 22,500 feet, and the B-10, with a maximum speed of 200 mph and ceiling of
25,200 feet, may have outperformed operational pursuit craft in 1933, pursuit aviation
was not standing still.35 The introduction of the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress in 1935,
with a maximum speed of 302 mph and maximum ceiling of 36,600 feet, may have
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upped the ante, but it did not force pursuit out of the game.36 The failure of USAAF
leadership to recognize that technology progresses much more rapidly than doctrine can
incorporate change resulted in a significant disconnect between prewar doctrine and its
application. One needed only to look at the speed and altitude records achieved during
the 1930s to see what was on the way to face off against American bombers. Speed
records for single seat aircraft went from 294 mph in 1932 to 351 mph in 1935 and would
jump to 468 mph in 1939.37 Altitude records would go from 43,978 feet in 1932 to
56,049 feet in 1938.38 While these records may have been set by prototypes and
specialized aircraft, today‟s prototype is tomorrow‟s production model and it is beholden
upon policy makers to recognize this fact and plan accordingly.

Blinded by the B-17
One cannot overemphasize the impact of the B-17 upon American bombardment
doctrine. This aircraft, coupled with the Norden M-1 bombsight, provided the means
which, in the minds of air planners at the time, would allow for strategic bombardment to
come into reality. In order to justify these programs there again existed a certain amount
of subterfuge on the part of the Army Air Corps as the B-17, an aircraft which at its core
was a purely offensive weapon, was sold to both the public and politicians as the best
means to achieve coastal defense. “As late as 1939 the impression persisted, outside of
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the Army as well as in, that the Air Corps bombers were being built purely for defense.”39
The strategy worked and the first 13 B-17s were delivered to the Army between January
and August of 1937.40
With anywhere from ten to thirteen machine guns mounted on the B-17,
depending on the model, the existence of such a heavily-armed aircraft reinforced the
already established beliefs of bomber self-defense and bomber invincibility. Though this
concept did result in a lack of an escort fighter during the early missions over Europe,
prewar planners were not naïve enough to believe that even a B-17 could survive an
onslaught of enemy fighter opposition alone. The use of formation flying, which allowed
for the overlapping of gunfire, provided a stronger defensive network surrounding the
aircraft.41 This practice raises some very important points. First, the acceptance of
formation flying can be seen as an acknowledgement of the advancements in air defense
technology and an expression of a fear that the bomber may not be invincible after all. If
planners were willing to go this far, then why not push for the development of an escort
fighter as an indispensible component of the bomber offensive prior to massive losses
over Europe? Secondly, formation flying may have provided a much more efficient
defense against fighter aircraft, but what of anti-aircraft artillery? Clustering the bombers
together would greatly assist the ground defense; not only would the probability of hitting
a target in the general area increase but there would also be less space between targets,
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requiring less time for sighting of subsequent targets, hence allowing more rounds to be
fired per minute.
But the central problem inherent in formation flying deals with space and time. If
you are advocating a „precision‟ bombing strategy then it is implied that area bombing is
not desired nor an effective means to achieve the desired ends. Truly „precision‟ targets
were expected to be small (100 feet x 100) and accuracy even under controlled conditions
was difficult to achieve.42
There exists at 23,000 feet a finite number of locations within which an aircraft
can release its bomb and have it successfully land on target, and the smaller the target the
fewer such places there are. At this time there were no GPS or laser guidance systems;
successful delivery of ordinance was reliant upon properly choosing when to release the
bomb to allow gravity to bring it to its desired destination. The Norden bombsight existed
to calculate when this point in space and time had been reached, and even if human error
did not affect the bomb run such precise computations only counted for the lead aircraft
doing the calculations. Combined with the practice of „dropping on the leader‟, formation
flying was not a means to achieve true single-shot precision strikes. It was, in practice,
“the area bombing of selected industrial targets and their immediate surroundings.”43 To
achieve true precision bombing the attacking aircraft would have to approach the target
single file, calculating their aiming points independently. Due to defensive necessity and
the reliance on probability to achieve a precision strike individual approaches were not
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possible and the result was that each aircraft had the final location of their bomb drop
dictated by their position in formation. When the lead plane, whose bombardier had
calculated when to release his bomb load to achieve a hit, dropped its load the other
aircraft in the formation did as well and it was not physically possible for their bombs to
hit the same location.
If the formation was the
size of a football field and the
aircraft all dropped their bombs at
the same time then the bomb
pattern would be the size of a
football field, and formations
were often much larger than this.
“For example, in March 1943 the
54-bomber box was about 1 1/3
miles wide, spread 2500 feet in
44

altitude and 1/3 mile from

front to back.”45 The only way that adding bombers could increase the probability of a hit
on such small targets would be to bomb single file or in pairs, not in wide defensive
formations. What the air planners had really devised was a means to achieve localized
area bombing, though it was publicly claimed to be a technique that could achieve
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precision strikes to destroy the enemy‟s productive capacity with a minimum of collateral
damage. The B-17 reinforced the defensible bomber theory which resulted in both the
delaying of an effective escort fighter and the inability to achieve true „precision‟.
USAAF doctrine, according to one of its creators General Haywood Hansell, was
“a concept developed through logic, map problems, and war games.”46 It was not the
result of experience but rather calculations formed in an office with a calculator and
probability tables based on limited testing data. Major Harold George, during the first
session of his Air Force course in 1935, told his students: “From today on much that we
shall study will require us to start with nothing more than an acknowledged truth and then
attempt, by the utilization of common sense and logic, to evolve a formula that we
believe will stand up under the crucial test of actual conditions.”47 While the creation of a
new technological doctrine is an amazing feat and itself worthy of praise, the lack of
thorough testing calls the motives of air planners into question. “In teaching the subject
of air force employment, the instructors at the Tactical School solved the problem by
ignoring the actual strategical demands of the United States and by discussing pure
theory.”48 When boiled down to its most basic level, the doctrine developed at ACTS was
one of assumption based upon assumption. While the lack of a conflict to test these new
ideas was not the fault of the minds at ACTS, blind faith in untested doctrine and an
inability to accept outside criticism solely belong to them. “Although it is not surprising
that the Air Corps theorists developed such ideas in the absence of actual tests, what is
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remarkable is the tenacity with which they held to them even when these ideas were
discredited by the experience of war.”49 Resistance to doctrinal revision when confronted
with its operational shortcomings was a result of both bureaucratic rigidity and
uncompromising ideology. By the end of the 1930s, air planners could argue their
convictions with such fervor, tenacity, and statistical evidence that they eagerly awaited
the day when they could proselytize to the great masses and unveil the dawn of the
bomber.
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Chapter 2: Making It Official
Early doctrinal developers knew that their ideas were outside of the accepted
norms of the military system, and they chose to wait for the proper moment to present
their new vision of the power of strategic bombardment. When the time came it provided
an opportunity for airmen to codify their beliefs into a single document, a type of
„Bombardment Constitution‟.
AWPD/1: Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces was produced in
response to President Roosevelt‟s request of July 9th, 1941 which called for Army and
Navy war production estimates. As it was almost impossible to answer this request
“without asking fundamental questions about what the Army Air Forces were supposed
to do in Europe,”50 this document went beyond simply discussing hardware and
manpower needs and became the vessel by which the doctrine developed at ACTS was
presented and sold to decision makers in Washington for its application in a future
conflict. “It marked the first time that airmen in the Army Air Forces were permitted to
do their own planning, thus it was a critically important step in their move towards
independence.”51 General Henry „Hap‟ Arnold, commander of the Army Air Corps, had
fought against the idea of a simple air annex to the War Department‟s overall report, and
his tenacity paid off.52 The idea that only airmen were truly qualified to deal with matters
of aviation, a concept championed by Mitchell after World War I, had come one step
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closer to reality. “Tacitly, though not legally, the AAF staff had assumed on this occasion
a position of equality with those of the other arms.”53 The team that was created consisted
of former instructors from the Air Corps Tactical School: Lt. Col. Harold L. George, Lt.
Col. Kenneth Walker, Major Haywood S. Hansell, and Major Laurence S. Kuter. As
Hansell later wrote, “We realized instinctively that a major milestone had been
reached.”54 The plan would be created between August 5th and August 12th 1941 in the
Munitions Building in Washington D.C.55
“The only restriction given George was that his proposal had to conform to
RAINBOW 5, the overall war plan agreed to by the British and American staffs during
the “ABC” discussions in May 1941.”56 It was agreed that Germany constituted the
greatest threat to the Allies and her defeat would be the primary objective in a future war.
Once a potential enemy is known it becomes easier to develop a method of attack. What
is amazing in this case is that an elaborate method of attack had been formulated,
clarified, and fully accepted by airmen for the proper use of bombardment long before the
enemy had become clear.
The document itself is fascinating, not only for its codification of and blind faith
in doctrine as developed at ACTS but also the predominate role given to this untested
theory in the overall war strategy. The purpose of air power in a future war with Germany
was to “wage a sustained air offensive against German military power” and to “support a
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final offensive, if it becomes necessary to invade the continent.”57 After struggling with
the Navy throughout the 1930s over the issue of coastal defense,58 the Air Corps was now
claiming, within an official document, that it could bring about Germany‟s surrender
through bombing alone without the assistance of the other two established branches. This
was not a requirements plan for joint action, but rather a document that focused solely on
what was needed for the USAAF to destroy the enemy. Not only was it a go-it-alone war
plan, it also disregarded many of the lessons already learned by other nations in two years
of modern warfare. “In spite of earlier German and English experience, it was concluded
that… it would be feasible to make deep penetrations into Germany by day.”59 The belief
that they could accomplish the complete destruction of Germany‟s economy and
therefore bring about its capitulation without the other branches of the armed forces is a
wonderful example of the quasi-religious belief that airmen had in their new weapons and
doctrine.
It is important to note that there were no economic or industrial experts among the
four officers who would establish industrial target priorities for the bombers. Haywood
Hansell made much of his time in the newly created Strategic Air Intelligence Division in
1940 and of his trip to England to gather intelligence of German industry, but he was not
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a technical expert in the field.60 “What he knew was enough to convince Hal George and
the others that their plan, whatever it turned out to be, would be based upon a
theoretically and practically sound approach to targets in the German economy and war
machine.”61
One of the key assumptions upon which AWPD/1 was based was the state of the
German economy. Looking at the situation in Europe from an American perspective, the
Air War Planning Division team saw a system stretched to its limits that could easy be
pushed over the edge by applying pressure to certain defined areas:

Nearly 17 million men are directly engaged in this war, to the exclusion of
all normal civil pursuits and production. Hence, there is a very heavy drain
on the social and economic structure of the state. Destruction of that
structure will virtually break down the capacity of the German nation to
wage war.62

This presumption neither takes into account the impact of foreign workers nor the
elasticity inherent within the German economic system. It was assumed that Germany
was at full production simply because if America was in that situation it would be, and is
more the projection of the American system upon Nazi Germany than reality. According
to Gaston, this was largely due to Hansell, who “knew far more than they had any right to
expect, and less than any of them could imagine.”63
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Proposed Target Systems
Target

priorities consisted of

three major

systems:

electrical

power,

transportation, and oil. The planners also included morale which was to be a target only if
the enemy needed a final nudge after the destruction of the first three target systems.
Electricity was seen as the backbone of an industrialized society, and fifty electrical
targets were selected. “They are precision targets. A typical plant covers an area about
500 ft. x 500 ft. The British estimate that about 17 hits in that area will guarantee
destruction of the plant.”64 The Luftwaffe itself was listed as an “intermediate objective,
whose accomplishment may be essential to the accomplishment of the principle
objectives.”65 It is interesting that the enemy‟s air force was not considered a primary
target. This illustrates the depth to which the invincible bomber theory had taken root
among airmen and also the desire to remove themselves from the counter-air role
assigned to aviation since World War One.
AWDP/1 claimed that “the German railways are working at capacity.”66 Though
the network covered the entire extent of Germany it was still seen as a viable target due
to perceived strain. Forty-seven transportation weak points were selected, consisting of
both railway targets (marshalling yards and bridges) and inland waterway targets (ship
elevators, locks, and harbors).67 The importance of the German transportation system is
acutely understood within AWPD/1, unfortunately this insight would not return until the
very end of operations in Europe. “It is estimated that disruption of the marshalling yards
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of the Ruhr for 24 hours sets back the production of the Ruhr about two weeks.” 68 What
the planners failed to do was take this a step further; why would this disruption have such
an effect on production? The answer lies in Germany‟s dependence on coal, not oil. This
gap in the understanding of German industry can largely be attributed to the projection of
the American industrial system upon Germany and would prove to be one of the failures
of prewar doctrinal development.
Oil was seen as indispensible to the German system. “German transportation, the
German Air Force, the German Navy, and German industry all are dependent upon oil.”69
Note the exclusion of the Wehrmacht from this list, and postwar analysis would show
that only the Luftwaffe was entirely dependent upon oil. According to AWPD/1:
About 60% of aviation gasoline comes from synthetic production in
Germany proper. Eighty per cent of this production comes from 27 plants.
These plants vary from 400 to 1,000 miles from England. They are easily
distinguishable in daylight, and they are susceptible to destruction by
bombing. They are precision targets.
About 22% of the oil for aviation gasoline comes from Rumania. It is
refined in Rumania and is moved primarily by water transportation up the
Danube to Germany. Success in the oil venture might necessitate
operating against the Danube to stop this flow. Hence, the importance of
retaining bases in Asia Minor or Syria.” 70
This section is important in two respects. First, it illustrates a lack of
understanding of the German crude and synthetic oil industries. While aviation fuel was
indeed dependent upon synthetic production through either the Fischer-Tropsch process
or Bergius hydrogenation method, it was to a much greater extent than believed. In fact,
aviation fuel was almost entirely reliant upon synthetic production due to the high octane
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content required.71 Also, as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, Germany
knew of its precarious position in regards to crude oil supplies and had adjusted its
economic base accordingly. “Less than 15 per cent of their aviation fuel and only a fourth
of all their oil products made early in 1944 came from crude oil. The rest came from coal
as did also nearly all of Germany‟s rubber, explosives, and other war materials.”72 This of
course raises the larger question of just how critical Ploesti was to the German economy.
The doctrine developed at the Air Corps Tactical School saw its culmination in
AWPD/1. It was believed that by destroying electrical, transportation, and oil targets a
wholesale disruption of the German economy would result and the industrial web would
crumble due to the loss of these few vital strands holding it together. It is important to
note that of these three systems electrical power would never become an actual target
during the war and transportation, until the very end of the war in Europe, would play
second fiddle to oil.

Plan Feasibility and Requirements
Once the mission of bombardment had been presented the planners were able to
address the purpose of the document, the hardware and manpower requirements to
achieve victory. But first a vital question had to be addressed: was the plan possible?
Would the bombers make it through? In reference to German fighter opposition it was
recognized that the B-17 could not outrun the more agile interceptors. “The B-17s rely
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upon speed, altitude, and deception. However, they have been intercepted, and each time
the ME 109s were capable of flying above them and of overtaking them.”73 It was due to
this that a reversal occurred within AWPD/1 and a call for a long-range escort fighter was
added into the document. Aircraft take time to develop, test, and manufacture, and to
finally recognize the need for such a fighter in 1941 calls into question the earlier
motivations of bombardment planners at ACTS. In their desire to establish a mission
apart from that of pursuit and observation forced upon them by the military establishment
the Air Corps failed to produce a well-rounded, all inclusive doctrine during the 1930s.
Hansell would later see this as a significant weakness within ACTS doctrine. “Failure to
see this issue through proved one of the Air Corps Tactical School‟s major
shortcomings.”74
The deadliness of anti-aircraft artillery was also recognized, though the solution
provided was not a practical one. “It is necessary for bombers to keep maneuvering to
avoid being shot down, even at 18,000 feet. The Germans use radio predictions, and fire
with amazing accuracy, even through an overcast.”75 The Norden bombsight required a
steady bomb run, in fact the pilot lost control of the aircraft when the bombardier was
setting up for the approach. Due to the technical advances to bring about „precision‟
attacks it was not possible to maneuver for up to five minutes during the approach to the
target.76 Because of the doctrine of precision bombing, which was a result of the
industrial web theory, air crews were, in essence, sitting ducks over these heavily
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defended target areas. That a call for an escort fighter and a countermeasure for antiaircraft fire, however superficial, were included within AWPD/1 demonstrates that when
push came to shove air planners themselves were not truly convinced of the invincibility
of the bomber. Despite these acknowledgements of the reality of German defenses,
somehow the conclusion was reached that the mission was possible. “Consideration of all
these factors leads to the conclusion, that by deploying large numbers of aircraft with
high speed, good defensive fire power, and high altitude, it is feasible to make deep
penetrations into Germany in daylight.”77 The argument is not convincing, and it would
be severely tested in the skies over Schweinfurt and Regensburg.
In order to justify force requirements the AWPD team had to present the logic
behind their calculations, and to do so they looked to U.S. bombing range data from June
through December of 1940. First, the assumed altitude of attack was set at 20,000 feet
and the target size was set at 100 feet x 100 feet. The current American range error of 220
feet and structure error of 275 feet were factored into the equation and, to allow for
combat conditions, the current bombing error was multiplied by 2.25. Then the single
shot probability (SSP), the probability that at least one bomb would hit the target, was
calculated at .012. Based on this data it was determined how many aircraft, and therefore
would many bomb drops, would be required to ensure destruction of the target. “SSP of
.012 results in a requirement of 220 bombs (planes) to secure one hit. To secure one hit
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against target of selected size – 220 airplanes (bombers) are required.”78 There were some
very important preconceptions which went into this probability formulation:
Assumption – one hit of proper size bomb on target should affect its
destruction. The majority of targets will be susceptible of (to) destruction
by bombs of the smaller sizes (1000#, 500#). One hit of such size bomb
indicates a high probability of other hits from remaining bombs released
from plane simultaneously. Hence, for purposes of calculation, one bomb
equals one airplane as a conservative basis for calculating force.79

Equating one bomb on target with that target‟s destruction would cause immense
frustration not only for planners but also for the men who were sent back over heavilydefended targets again and again. The idea that either a 500 lb. or 1,000 lb. bomb would
be sufficient against targets with hardened defenses proved false. The most amazing
aspect of all this is that there were no trials against dummy targets within the United
States prior to the war to support these assertions. There is no record of tests against old
or mock refineries and electric powerhouses, nor discussion of bombardment tests upon
rail centers during peacetime to demonstrate the feasibility of ACTS doctrine.
The amount of planes required for the destruction of the target based on these
calculations is phenomenal. With 36 aircraft per group, it was determined that, after
factoring in the 2.25 factor for wartime error, it would require 30 group missions to
destroy the target, or 1,080 effective sorties. George and his team were not only calling
for a total of 98 groups (6,834 bombardment aircraft total)80 to test their industrial web
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theory, but also the industrial, economic, and human requirements to put them in the air.
However, the most chilling aspect of AWPD/1 is its discussion of expected attrition rates.
“Current W.D. attrition rates (20% per month loss in airplanes by all units except
operational training units were (sic) 3% prevails) applied throughout.”81 With 6,834 total
aircraft called for this would be a loss of 1,367 aircraft per month. With an average crew
of ten per bomber this would mean an expected casualty rate of 13,670 men per month.
Men with families and futures. And this plan was accepted without radical modification
by Secretary of War Henry Stimson and General George Marshall. Hansell, writing later,
would claim a higher expected rate than that. “Anticipated attrition called for a monthly
replacement rate of some 2,133 aircraft.”82 The fact that that this plan was sold to the
public as an efficient means to wage war against Germany and that it was not
significantly challenged speaks to the power of prewar notions about the possibilities of
airpower.

From Paper to Reality
President Roosevelt came to see the diplomatic leverage that could be gained
from what is perceived to be a powerful air force after the Munich Crisis in September of
1938. William Bullitt, Ambassador to France, wrote to Roosevelt on September 20th
stating that “If you have enough airplanes you don‟t have to go to Berchtesgaden.”83
Though FDR became acutely aware of the position of air power within modern
81
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diplomacy, this does not mean that he was immediately sold on strategic bombing as
developed at ACTS during the 1930s. As Sherry points out, “He formed no alliance with
the bomber enthusiasts, probably as yet unfamiliar with their ideas.”84 The pivotal event
for the realization of the Air Corp‟s vision was Roosevelt‟s May 16, 1940 address before
a joint session of Congress. After painting the picture of a highly vulnerable America
because of the aviation advances of the Axis Powers, FDR proceeded to call for a 50,000
aircraft force along with the industrial capacity to reinforce it completely every year. To
pay not only for the material but also the necessary training and logistical costs he
requested a total appropriation of $896,000,000.85 Though this was not the first
appropriations request for war materiel, and by no means the last, it was a firm and public
acknowledgement by the President that, in his belief, airpower in some form would play a
decisive role in the next conflict. Having been a Navy man, it would have been
understandable had Roosevelt called for a predominately naval expansion. The fact that
he did not is very telling. Roosevelt recognized that in modern warfare the airplane
provided something in abundance that was difficult to attain through conventional land
and sea forces. “Defense cannot be static. Defense must grow and change from day to
day. Defense must be dynamic and flexible, an expression of the vital forces of the nation
and of its resolute will to meet whatever challenge the future may hold.”86 Nothing
embodied flexibility, nor allowed for the offensive defense alluded to by Roosevelt, like
airpower.
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With the public endorsement of the President and the financial backing of
Congress a large bureaucratic system emerged to implement the strategic vision of air
planners. Not only was there an immense desire for aircraft but also for the crews to fly
them. Civilian trainers at private air schools contracted with the Army and “Air Corps
personnel jumped from 20,503 on 1 July 1939 to 152,569 just two years later.” 87 In
discussing his training to become a B-24 pilot John J. Hibbits portrayed a program that
focused on producing quality crews as rapidly as possible. Through his journey from
Preflight Training to Primary, from Basic to Advanced, and lastly to B-24 Training, it is
clear that there existed a rush to get these boys flying. Just the sheer number of schools in
the training process shows the seriousness and thoroughness demanded by the Air Corps
even in times of imminent hostilities. Hibbits makes one extremely important point:
while rigorously educated in the principles of aerodynamics, meteorology, navigation,
formation flying, and air and naval identification there was no indoctrination of the
theory underlying the tactics. “There was as little discussion of theory as possible, while
practical facts were poured into our brains every minute.”88 Those putting the plan into
action were not trained in the intricacies of the doctrine underlying their missions; they
were to carry them out, not understand the reasoning behind them. Craven and Cate point
out that training “emphasized the importance of formation flying at all altitudes, of
accuracy in bombing and gunnery, and of the development of well-integrated combat
crews.”89
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Before Pearl Harbor American airmen had developed a plan for the effective use
of the new air weapon and had convinced their superiors of the soundness of it. President
Roosevelt became convinced of the necessity of airpower due to events in Europe and it
was through his demands that air planners were allowed the means to bring their vision of
strategic bombing into reality.
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Chapter 3: The True Nature of the
Enemy Economy
In order to properly analyze the effects of American strategic bombing doctrine it
is necessary to take a look at its intended target, the German economy. Only when these
two pieces of the puzzle are interlocked can one step back and appreciate the final
picture, the results of the American bombing campaign. This raises the question of just
how important was Ploesti to the Nazi war machine. Was it, as many then and now have
argued, the foundation upon which the German military depended? Did this reliance
carry over to the German economy? It is important to remember that American doctrine
was aimed at the economic foundations of the enemy‟s military, not the military itself. In
order to properly address the importance of Ploesti we must first look at the German war
economy and specifically the role of petroleum in it.
As discussed in the previous chapter the American view of the German economy
was of one operating under heavy strain, stretched to the limit and teetering on the edge.
It was viewed as being in such dire straits that only six months of bombardment would be
needed to bring about its collapse, and with it the capitulation of the German military.
Yet, the German economy was able to support the army until 1945. Why the
discrepancy? Going against the stereotype of efficiency, Germany‟s economy was never
completely harnessed for war. “While the German economy was approaching its basic
limitations in mid-1944, it never attained its full war potential.”90 This was due to the
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German economy never truly being put on a total war footing. According to historian
Alan S. Milward, “In 1942 consumers‟ expenditures, in terms of 1939 Reichsmarks,
stood practically equal to 1937 when the civilian population was almost the same size.”91
The Nazi regime was determined to produce both guns and butter as long as possible to
placate the population.
The economic initiatives under first Fritz Todt and then Albert Speer were able to
wring increased production from an economy under siege by introducing new methods of
efficiency and limiting production models. Many of the reforms enacted, such as double
and triple shifts, were already in effect in Britain and America. This modernizing of the
German economy had an immediate and pronounced effect upon German war production.
“Despite the damage wrought by air attack and territorial losses, and despite the general
drop in production in the second half of 1944, total industrial output for the year was the
highest of the war.”92 One can only wonder what would have happened if Germany had
developed a total war economy prior to 1939.
It is interesting that when one studies the German economy the discussion
invariably gravitates towards Germany‟s raw material situation, in particular that of oil. Is
this due to oil‟s central place within the German industrial system or more so because of
the Allied bombing campaign against it? “With the exception of synthetic oil, basic
industrial materials were not major targets in the combined air offensive against
Germany.”93 War planners projected many aspects of the American economy and war

91

Alan S. Milward, The German Economy at War. (London: Athlone Press, 1965), 29.
USSBS, German War Economy, 26.
93
Ibid., 63.
92

Seyer, Sean, 2009, UMSL, p.46

experience into their understanding of Germany, was oil yet another victim of this
phenomena? Has oil maintained its historical status as a critical economic target system
due to it actually being one or due to the effort expended in lives and material in
attacking it?
On September 9, 1936, the Four Year Plan was implemented in Germany under
the auspices of Hitler‟s second in command, Hermann Goering. The purpose of this
measure was to bolster Germany‟s raw material production capabilities, especially in the
areas of synthetic fuel and rubber. 1,261 million Reichsmarks were set aside for the
program and “one-half of the total investment undertaken in connection with the Four
Year Plan was related to the production of synthetic fuel.”94 The belief was that Germany
would be capable of supporting military operations within four years without requiring
raw material imports which, if World War One was any guide, would be cut off due to a
blockade of the continent. “Capacity for synthetic oil production was increased more than
twofold (in) 1936 and 1939. But the 1939 output was 45 per cent below what had been
envisioned.”95 Though unable to achieve the desired growth, investment along these lines
did not stop with the beginning of hostilities in 1939:
Synthetic rubber production was raised from 5,000 tons to 134,000 tons
per annum between 1939 and 1944; the latter was adequate to cover all
requirements. In the case of oil, synthetic production was raised from 1.3
million tons in 1938 to an annual rate of 6 million tons by early 1944,
while crude oil production was expanded (through the development of
Austrian fields) from 0.6 to 2.0 million tons. Together with the Rumanian
and Hungarian supplies of about 2.5 million tons, these were adequate to
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achieve the needs of the armed forces, whose pattern of consumption was,
of course, itself adjusted to the oil situation.96

Oil and the German Military
The belief that the German‟s were heavily dependent upon oil is mostly the result
of a serious misconception of the German army both then and now. With the
development of blitzkrieg warfare and its reliance on mechanized units, the impression
was purposely made upon the world that the entire German military was a modern force
powered by the internal combustion engine. This belief does not stand up under scrutiny.
In fact, mechanized and motorized divisions “generally composed well under 25 percent
of the divisions deployed by the Wehrmacht.”97 The small number of motorized divisions
is astonishing when one looks at the composition of the German forces during the
invasion of Poland. “Of the total of 102 divisions, only the 14 mobile divisions were
completely motorized.”98 This is a long way from the perception, created by images
played in newsreels around the globe, of a fully modern and mobile army pouring across
the border. The tip of the sword may have been motorized for quick trusts and piercing
attacks, but the bulk of the German land force would rely on that ancient means of
locomotion, the horse. “The standard German infantry division (1939 pattern) required
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anything from 4,077 to 6,033 horses to move.”99 Knowing that they lacked the means to
fuel a fully mechanized military, German leaders did not create one. “Of the 35.6 billion
Reichsmarks to be spent between 1937 and 1941, less than 5 per cent (4.7 percent) was
earmarked for tanks and motor vehicles. By contrast, guns, artillery and ammunition were
allocated 32 per cent of the budget.”100 The main exception to this was of course the
Luftwaffe, which was wholly reliant on aviation-grade fuel to be of any use whatsoever.
Total petroleum production in 1940 within Germany and its occupied territories
(excluding Romania) was 3,963,000 tons. Though total consumption amounted to
5,856,000 tons, the total produced within the Reich more than covered the 3,005,000 tons
necessary for the armed forces. In 1943, when the Combined Bomber Offensive began,
Greater Germany was producing 6,563,000 tons of petroleum with a military requirement
of 4,762,000 tons.101 Germany may not have been able to produce enough petroleum
within her borders to meet all requirements but she was able to meet her military needs.
The system was designed for short, decisive wars that would produce, and were based
upon, an ebb and flow of petrol stocks. Fuel stocks from conquests were no small factor
and, though not sources of continuous supply, must also be factored into the equation.102
The invasion of the U.S.S.R. does not appear initially to have upset the oil situation in
regards to domestic and industrial use. Jensen points out that, “with the exception of one
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million tons of oil delivered to Germany, the rest of the Rumanian oil production went
directly to the front in the East.”103 This fact forces one to draw the conclusion that
industry, and therefore the German economy, was not reliant upon Romanian crude. This
source was necessary to allow for extensive military activities, such as Operation
Barbarossa. Only when operations had to be maintained over an extended period of time
did fuel stocks become an issue.
The predominant school of thought is that Germany‟s oil situation was precarious,
bordering on crisis, even at the earliest stages of the war and that she struggled
throughout. According to Klein, “stocks and current production of oil products…could
guarantee consumption requirements for a period of only three to six months.”104 The
question then becomes, like so many aspects of this study, one of perception. To someone
living in a highly mechanized, oil based society, the level of stocks discussed by Klein
would cause severe worry and nervousness. To someone from a less industrialized nation,
or one that had an industrial base supported by a different type of energy, this supply may
appear more than sufficient to meet projected needs. Jensen portrays Germany as a nation
deep in the grip of oil addiction living hand to mouth, with the shadow of painful
withdraw ever-present. Tooze does see a reliance upon oil within Germany, but also
recognizes that her infrastructure and requirements were much different than those of her
opponents. As has already been mentioned, the USSBS team studying the effects of
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bombing on the German war economy believed that, for the most part, Germany‟s supply
of oil met her limited needs.

A Coal-Based Economy
If the military was not as oil-hungry as has been popularly understood, was there
a dependence upon oil within Germany‟s civilian and industrial sectors? The Reichsbahn,
the German rail system, operated almost entirely on coal; apart from lubrication oil,
petroleum-based fuel was noticeably absent in its daily operations. With the vast majority
of industrial transport by rail, the necessity of oil for logistical purposes was largely
removed. As far as civilian consumption, though it was indeed Hitler‟s dream to create a
nation of motorized citizens, a rabid desire for consumer petrol was never brought into
existence within the Reich. Tooze points to the high entry costs of the automobile, even
after Opel‟s price drop in the early 1930s to 1,450 Reichsmarks, as the main reason
Hitler‟s vision did not materialize.105 This amount was still a sizable chunk of income for
the average worker, and the Volkswagen project was unable to meet consumer demand
due to the war.106 This left the luxury of the automobile in the hands of the upper and
upper-middle classes, and though they had the funds available to purchase fuel such a
small market could not affect oil supplies to a great extent. In 1933, the ratio of
automobiles to Germans was 1 per 90.107 This increased within the following years,
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reaching 1 per every 47 people by 1937.108 Though automobile ownership did increase
during the 1930s it was far from the American ratio of 1 car per 3.5 people in 1933.109 It
is curious that Hitler would deliberately try to create a situation of dependence upon a
substance in limited supply, but one can say the same thing about late twentieth-century
America.
What of the other pillar of modern industrial economies, electricity? “Electric
power was derived almost exclusively from coal.”110 This resource which, according to
AWPD/1, all industry relied upon was itself wholly reliant upon the German coal industry
and the transportation network that delivered this precious commodity. Electrical power
would be reduced to fourth priority by U.S. planners, after transportation and before oil,
in the follow-up to AWPD/1, AWPD/42: Requirements for Air Ascendancy, presented
September 9, 1942.111 Going much more in depth than its predecessor, it would
ultimately not be approved due to its inability to persuade Admiral King. 112 “The combat
experience to date was still too meager to provide a realistic yardstick for bombing
accuracy and for the size of the force required. However, the computations were still
based on the old tables of probability, which were in turn based on independent sighting
operations.”113 It would appear that the Navy, dealing with its own situation on two fronts
and after having observed limited air success, was not about to take another leap of faith
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based on charts and graphs. Instead the target priorities of the Committee of Operational
Analysts, which was created by order of Gen. Arnold on December 9, 1942, would be
accepted. Electrical power and transportation would not make their list. The COA
believed that these systems were “too widely dispersed” to allow for the practical
application of force.114 Why was it so hard for the Allies to understand the basic
foundations of the German economy? Oil was considered a valid strategic target from
AWPD/1 to the war‟s end, and this fact strongly supports the notion that Americans could
not completely grasp the concept that an industrialized system may not mirror their own.
The German economy, though often achieving the same results, was based on an entirely
different foundation:

Wartime Germany was a chemical empire built on coal, air and water.
Eighty-four and a half per cent of her aviation fuel, 85 per cent of her
motor gasoline, all but a fraction of 1 per cent of her rubber, 100 per cent
of the concentrated nitric acid, basic component of all military explosives,
and 99 per cent of her equally important methanol were synthesized from
these three fundamental raw materials.115

History has shown us that nations have a tendency to develop that which they
process in abundance; they do not create an elaborate infrastructure based on materials
which are foreign or sparse. America had massive amounts of crude and the means to
exploit it in the twentieth century; therefore she developed an extensive oil system to
complement her existing coal base. This allowed for a thorough exploitation of the
internal combustion engine. Germany was not blessed with large amounts of oil reserves
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and neither was most of the continent of Europe, therefore she developed a coal-intensive
system complemented by the limited supplies of oil available. Germany even turned to
coal as a means to fulfill her petroleum needs, utilizing an intricate system of synthetic oil
plants. Due to their reliance upon coal they were situated close to coal deposits, which
put them in range of Allied four-engine bombers based in England.116
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The synthetic industry produced such vital components as oil, nitrogen, and
rubber, and was entirely dependent upon coal. The ratio of tons of coal to finished tons of
synthetic gasoline was 6:1.118 This may seem staggering, but German coal production
from 1938-1939 was 240 million tons, which was increased to 340 million by 1942-
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1943.119 Though this is a massive number, one must take in to account the demand. Coal
permeated every aspect of German life and coal shortages had the potential to be felt
system-wide; oil shortages would affect a much narrower and primarily military sector.
Various grades of coal were used in almost all levels of manufacturing, kept the
locomotives of the Reichsbahn moving, heated the homes of the population in winter,
were burned to generate electricity, and were the primary component in the vital synthetic
industry. If the desire of strategic planners was to target the absolutely fundamental
pillars of the German economy the focus should have been on coal and the transportation
system that distributed this vital commodity across the nation, not oil.120

What Good is a Plane without Fuel?
As mentioned previously, there was one area were oil products, particularly
synthetic oil, were vital: aviation fuel. “Between 11 September and 19 September (1944),
the Allies succeeded in stopping completely all aviation spirit production in Germany
except for one day.”121 Though the Allied oil campaign did succeed in causing massive
aviation fuel shortages, can this be considered a „strategic‟ result? According to the
USSBS Oil Division Final Report, the air offensive succeeded because it “effectively
stopped oil production with decisive military consequences.”122 It is the consensus of
119
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historians that the constriction of aviation fuel stocks and the consequent defeat of the
Luftwaffe were the primary accomplishments of the USAAF in World War Two. While
such results are laudable and no doubt contributed to the defeat of the German military, it
is not the total capitulation resulting from an aerially-imposed economic breakdown
envisioned by American air theorists in the interwar years.
Germany did not create a military and industrial juggernaut and leave it
defenseless against air attack. In fact, due to its central position on the continent,
Germany developed one of the most extensive and intricate systems of active and passive
air defenses on the planet. Active defense can be divided into two main groups, fighter
aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery (flak). Passive defense consists of various means of
confusion and concealment, such as the use of smoke screens, dummy installations,
barrage balloons, camouflage, and radar countermeasures. All of these were used to
defend the oil refineries at Ploesti. Smoke screens were considered “one of their most
successful camouflage measures” and would be used extensively by the Germans.123
German fighter aircraft production continued to increase throughout the war but a
lack of fuel and pilots nullified these gains. 1943 production was almost twice as high as
1942, and 1944 saw nearly three times the level achieved in the early months of 1942.124
The German fighters, flying the by then dated Focke-Wolfe 190s and Messerschmitt
109s, did have to develop new tactics to overcome the range difference between their
guns and the .50 caliber guns of the B-17 and the Consolidated B-24 Liberator. “The
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attack from the front, high front, or low front all with low speed was the most effective of
all.”125 The Luftwaffe was neutralized as a fighting force through a battle of attrition;
forced to defend multiple targets it was bled slowly by first the bomber crews and then
the long-range escort fighter. The coup de grâce was the constriction of the fuel supply,
virtually eliminating training of replacement pilots.

The Role of Flak
Flak defenses would constitute a much graver threat to Allied bombers than
AWPD/1 expected. In his insightful study, entitled Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses,
1914-1945, Edward Westerman sheds some much needed light on this misunderstood
aspect of the air war over Europe and details how ground-to-air defenses “accounted for
at least half of American aircraft combat losses during the war.”126 With a maximum
ceiling of 33,000 feet for the 88-mm flak gun and a 48,559 feet maximum for the 128mm gun, the safety of high-altitude was greatly negated.127 USAAF losses in Europe
from flak would total 5,400, with 2,076 of these from the 15th Air Force which operated
against Ploesti in Romania. In all, flak caused four times more USAAF casualties than
fighters.128
Challenging the emphasis on fighter aircraft in the historical narrative Westerman
takes a more holistic approach to the Germany defense system, seeing both active and
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passive elements as interlocking and playing off each other‟s strengths to present a
formidable opponent to the Allied air offensive. He poses a fundamental question, that of
what constituted success in German defenses. “Would the measure of effectiveness lie in
the number of aircraft brought down, or would it be found in the more indeterminate
standard associated with success in protecting the bomber‟s intended target from
damage?”129 The prevalence of the first view would explain the emphasis on active
defenses within the historical dialogue. If held to this standard the anti-aircraft defense of
German cannot be viewed as a success; U.S. production more than compensated for any
loss of aircraft. If the second perspective is taken then one can argue that, due to
industrial production increases in spite of bombardment, the German defensive network
performed remarkably well under heavy strain. This question of perception and what
constitutes success is also vital in understanding the actions and results of the USAAF at
Ploesti.
The Germans developed a system based on the resource most abundantly
available to them, and though the internal combustion engine necessitated oil stocks it did
not result in the realigning of the German economy to petroleum. This was a fact lost on
American planners and, combined with the sizable air defense network created in Europe,
would be the cause of much grief in the campaign to come.
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Chapter 4: Too Little Too Soon
If the German economy‟s absolute dependence upon oil is questionable, or rather
if there existed target systems that were much more vital to its operation, how did the
Allies come to see it as being a necessary industrial component? A misunderstanding was
incorporated into policy because personal preference had as much to do with target
selection as solid analysis. Mierzejewski discusses in detail the struggle over target
priorities, with Gen. Spaatz‟s desire to target oil conflicting with Air Chief Marshall Sir
Arthur Tedder‟s (RAF) focus on transportation.130 General Arnold himself considered
Ploesti, and the oil refined there, to be “the most important target in the war.”131 The
difference in opinion was fueled by an increasingly powerful and unrestrained
intelligence apparatus composed of various agencies competing to ensure their target sets
were adopted. “The decisive factor, then, in determining what targets were attacked by
the Allied strategic air forces were the views of the decision makers, especially Harris,
Spaatz, and Tedder, their advisors access to them, the credibility that the intelligence
agencies enjoyed with them, and what was known about the German economy, especially
its energy and transportation sectors.”132 These bureaucratic entities included ad hoc ones
such as the Air War Planning Division and the Committee of Operations Analysts
(COA), and more permanent ones such as the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, the
Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU), the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of
130
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Strategic Services (OSS, R&A), and the Assistant Chief of Air Staff - Intelligence
(AC/AS A-2).133

The Allure of Ploesti
A fascination with the importance of oil had existed long before the outbreak of
war and was pervasive throughout both the military and civilian leadership. Winston
Churchill, in his first address as Prime Minister, lauded the air crews that were “striking
nightly at the tap root of German mechanized power, and have already inflicted serious
damage upon the oil refineries which the Nazi effort to dominate the world directly
depends.”134 Due to its position as the number one supplier of crude oil on the European
continent, Ploesti would naturally catch the eye of both politicians and planners. In 1939,
production of crude petroleum from Romania totaled 6,240,000 tons, which was 2.18%
of total world production. To put this into some perspective, the United States produced
173,512,939 tons that same year which constituted 60.45% of world output.135 With these
production numbers in mind it is easy to see the difference between the American
economy and that of Axis-dominated Europe. The United States had the luxury of
establishing oil-intensive industrial and military projects whereas Germany, with its
largest source of crude on the continent being only 3.59% of U.S. output, was limited
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from the start as to the shape of its „modern‟ state.136 It is also important to keep in mind
that Romanian refining capacity in 1939 was approximately 11,000,000 tons.137 This
would leave excess capacity in the amount of 4,760,000. This massive amount would first
have to be destroyed for any attacks to have an effect upon Romanian production and
therefore on the German war machine.
Germany was not the only nation that wanted access to Romanian crude. Before
the Germanization of Romanian oil production in 1940 the British, Dutch, French,
Belgians, Americans, and Italians all had a commercial interest in refinery operations.
The major refineries in the Ploesti area consisted of Astra Romana (British-Dutch),
Concordia Vega (French-Belgian), Romana-Americana (American), Unirea (British),
Orion (British), Standard Petrol Block (Romanian-foreign stock holders), Columbia
Aquila (French), Redeventa and Xenia (stock holders), Dacia, Steaua Romana (FrenchBritish-Romanian located northwest of Ploesti at nearby Campina), and Creditul Minier
(the only entirely Romanian owned refinery in the area south of Ploesti at Brazi).138 With
Ion Antonescu‟s seizure of power on September 5, 1940, a much more German-friendly
regime assisted in the ousting of foreign interests in Romania. As the following map
illustrates there was a clear distinction between the refinery areas and the population
centers, thus the campaigns against Ploesti provide a clear means to judge the
effectiveness of USAAF precision bombing doctrine in practice.
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The Defensive Situation at Ploesti
Even before the American entry into the war an idea of the extensive defenses at
Ploesti was available to air planners. Mr. Paul W. Lambright, the General Manager of
Standard Oil in Romania and a retired U.S. naval officer, submitted a series of reports in
1941 detailing the situation on the ground at the refineries. One of the key points of his
report is the necessity of accuracy to assure destruction of vital plant components. “Since
such vital points as boiler installations and electric power plants are already in most
instances, especially in the refineries, housed in brick buildings this is generally
considered sufficient protection except against direct hits.”140 Due to blast walls erected
around key points, Lambright determined that it would “require direct hits to effect much
damage on the units, unless very powerful bombs are used.”141 As far as anti-aircraft
defense are concerned, Lambright painted the picture of an area bristling with guns and
with fighter support close by.142
This situation was discussed much more in depth by William Mattingly, Manager
of Standard Oil in Romania and on location until October 1941. “The area is surrounded
by anti-aircraft batteries principally of 108 mm. guns, although there are also smaller 50
mm. rapid-fire combination anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns for use against low-flying
planes. The air defense of Ploesti has been taken over exclusively by the German Army,
both the material and the personnel thereof are German and all regulations for air-raid
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protection are adopted and enforced by the German military authorities.”143 It was made
perfectly apparent even before America entered the war that Ploesti would be a very
demanding target and would have to be approached with both effective planning and
sufficient force; the first American attack against it would demonstrate neither.

Showing Their Hand
In the wake of Pearl Harbor American citizens and their leaders desired to strike
back at their new enemies and the best and only means at their disposal was the longrange bomber. The Doolittle Raid on Tokyo was not the sole attack planned upon Japan.
The Halverson Project, named after the mission‟s commander Colonel Halverson and
nicknamed HALPRO, was originally slated for an attack on Japan but due to the loss of
Chinese airbases the B-24s remained in Khartoum, Sudan. Their target was changed to
Ploesti. There were some reservations about the mission, “but the Joint Chiefs overruled
the misgivings of some airmen who said that Ploesti was too far for planes to carry an
effective bomb load. They would have to trade bombs for extra gas to bring them
back.”144
The attack was launched against Ploesti before midnight on June 11, 1942,
making it the first attack by the USAAF against European targets in World War Two.145
It was kept a secret and the mission would not make its way into the press until June 14,
143
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and even then many vital details were not released.146 According to a post-mission
summary dated June 29, 1942, thirteen B-24s were launched from Fayid, Egypt, hardly
the massing of force called for by Mitchell. Formation flying was not used. Traveling just
under 1300 miles one way the crews were met with a less than optimal bombing
environment:

An overcast at 10,000 feet compelled many crews to bomb below the
clouds. Objectives were reported to be camouflaged. Heavy anti-aircraft
fire was encountered, and some planes met fighter resistance. At the same
time, technical difficulties, including ineffective bomb mechanisms and
duds, were encountered. The American Military Attaché at Ankara has
forwarded a report from French sources in Bucharest confirming that the
bombing results at Ploesti were restricted to several casualties and a few
destroyed houses, with no hits on the refineries.147

All that the HALPRO mission did, in effect, was inform the Nazis that the
Americans possessed the range, capability, and desire to attack Ploesti. According to
Dugan and Stewart, this fact was not lost on General Alfred Gerstenberg, the German
officer in charge of defending the town. He would oversee the construction of an aboveground piping system which connected the refineries to allow for quick repair and
continued production while making Ploesti the third-largest concentration of flak in
Europe.148 HALPRO did achieve one more thing in the mind of General Eisenhower, it
“did something to dispel the illusion that a few big planes could win a war.”149
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What Should Be Bombed?
After HALPRO the question regarding the bombing of Ploesti was not whether it
should be attempted but rather what constituted the optimal target to deny the Nazis
Romanian oil products.150 While acknowledging both the active and passive defenses
around vital areas within the refineries Lambright still saw them as being the optimum
target. An AAF Intelligence assessment of Ploesti pointed to the important role of the
refineries themselves, stating that the “twelve large oil refineries in this objective area
produce approximately 86% of the refined petroleum products of Rumania and represent
96% of the total cracking capacity.”151 The same report went on to mention the
importance of transportation in the region:

The Rumanian petroleum production (crude or refined) is of assistance to
the Axis only if the oil can be effectively transported from the Ploesti area.
Although the pipelines move a considerable amount of oil from Ploesti to
Giurgiu, yet (sic) 80% of the oil leaving this area moves by rail.
Continuous and effective operations against refineries and transportation
objectives in Rumania would result in a serious blow to the German war
effort.152

The importance of transportation to Ploesti was not lost on the OSS. In a report written
December 30, 1942, while it is recognized that the loss of the oil-producing capabilities
of the region would have a crippling effect on Axis supplies, the report reinforces the
opinion of AC/AS. “Germany‟s greatest problem has been one of transportation. Should
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the railroad between Ploesti and the crest of the Carpathians – a distance of about 50
miles – be bombed it would completely upset Germany‟s transportation system.”153
The COA took a different view of the oil situation and broke the system down
into crude and synthetic production at a committee meeting on December 23, 1942. In
regards to crude, the situation was quickly determined to be near insurmountable due to
the scope of the effort that would be required. “The refining capacity in Europe is far in
excess of the necessary consumption. It is so far in excess that it would be necessary to
destroy or neutralize 39 of the major refineries before you cut the refining capacity down
to the present consumption.”154 During the course of the meeting the consensus
developed that the sixteen Bergius hydrogenation plants within Germany were the
optimal link in the oil chain due to their flexibility and role in the production of precious
aviation fuel. The target was chosen not due to its strategic economic consequences but
its purely tactical military effect. There was the question of the possible rerouting of raw
materials to continue production, and the importance of transportation as a supporting
target became apparent. “The destruction of the Bergius plants and hitting transportation
to prevent Rumanian crude from being transported would have disastrous effects.”155
Any supposed attack on the transportation network of Ploesti was always assumed
to coincide with attacks on its refineries. The real question is: why not just attack
transportation out of Ploesti? The refineries could produce all the petroleum products in
the world but if the finished product was unable to get to the engines that required fuel
153
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then the oil was useless. The refineries were concentrated and therefore heavily defended,
whereas it would be impossible to defend every mile of rail leaving the city. The map on
page 61 shows one rail line leading northwest to Germany, one to the north, and one to
the eastern front. As mentioned previously rail moved 80% of the oil from Ploesti. Add to
this an extensive mining of the Danube and you have the means to produce the same
effect as the destruction of the refineries without having to eat away at excess capacity or
send men over an extremely heavily defended area. Why was this not attempted? Was it
the need to sell pictures of bomb damage to the public regardless of results? Did the idea
of strategic bombing burn so brightly in the minds of air planners that they were blinded
to alternate considerations?
The Bombardment Advisory Committee of the COA actually tackled the question
of making Ploesti‟s transportation the primary target. The report is not convincing. While
transportation along the Danube was important, its position in Ploesti‟s transportation
network was overestimated. “The blocking of the Danube appears to be a very doubtful
project. If it cannot be accomplished, it appears impossible to insure denying German
access to Rumanian oil.”156 A USSBS report after the war would claim that the limited
attacks on the Danube were extremely effective, that they “slowed traffic decisively,” and
that more extensive mining could have had a much more dramatic effect. 157 “Fifty-two
percent of the mine explosions resulted in total losses.”158
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Amazingly the Bombardment Advisory Committee disregarded transportation,
resulting in the COA not advocating it as a strategy at Ploesti. “The conclusion seems
inescapable that to deny Rumanian oil to the Axis war economy can be accomplished
through transportation targets only at a great expense and that the results in any event
would be uncertain.”159 As we shall see, one can look back at the entire USAAF
campaign over Ploesti and easily replace “transportation targets” in the above phrase with
“refinery targets” and it fits perfectly. Recognizing the fact that refinery capacity was
“nearly double” the output, the Committee still advocated for the targeting of the oil
refineries themselves.160 Ultimately, transportation would give way to refineries as the
optimum target at Ploesti due to the priorities and perceptions of the decision makers.161

ACTS Doctrine Discarded
There would be quite a time laps between the HALPRO mission and the
USAAF‟s return to Ploesti. This well publicized and studied mission would be
undertaken by the Ninth Air Force stationed in Libya under General Lewis Brereton and
would run counter to many of the central tenants of the strategic bombing doctrine
developed at ACTS. This mission “had the unique distinction of killing more airmen
(over 300) than persons on the ground (under 120) and the highest wastage (planes that
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never flew again) rate of any major mission of the war.”162 Again the refineries
themselves would be the targets, and the desire was to halt production at Ploesti through a
single devastating attack. Even at ACTS it was understood, at least early on, that repeated
missions would need to be flown to achieve total destruction of the target. According to
General Brereton, the return to Ploesti was “agitated in London” as early as April 9,
1943. Believing that current campaigns took precedence Brereton was “strongly
opposed” to such a mission at that time.163 Colonel Jacob Smart, an advisor in General
Arnold‟s staff, was given the job of planning the attack. He had “no combat experience”
and was assigned the nigh impossible task of knocking out production at Ploesti in a
single attack.164
Smart‟s solution was to attack the heavily-defended refineries at Ploesti at lowlevel. He would later say that he got the idea by observing a Douglas A-20 Havoc
demonstration.165 This was an aircraft designed for close-combat support, which was not
the case with the B-24 bomber.166 “It was understood that four-engine heavies were
totally unsuited for such a mission,”167 but the plan was approved by General
Eisenhower, General Arnold, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by Roosevelt and Churchill at
162
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the TRIDENT Conference in May 1943. According to Smart the decision was once again
a matter of numbers, as “it was quite apparent that we could not destroy the targets by
high-level attack. We could never muster and bring to bear the required force in sufficient
time to destroy the productive capacity effectively.”168 This is an extraordinarily telling
statement. It shows that there were those within Arnold‟s inner circle that had not bought
into the doctrine as developed at ACTS; many doubts remained about high-altitude
bombing and its ability to effectively destroy a target.169 Eisenhower would later discuss
his severe misgivings about the plan:

One feature to which we objected was the confidence placed in the
efficacy of a single attack. Too often we had found that factories listed by
our experts as destroyed were again working at full output within a matter
of weeks or even days. We raised another question as to the advisability of
the undertaking. The target selected was a great refinery, but our
information led us to believe that the enemy had a surplus of refining
capacity and that his true oil shortage was in production and distribution
facilities. Our doubts and objections were not, however, decisive in the
matter…170
What of Ploesti‟s defensive situation? Much unwarranted emphasis was put on
the element of surprise that was thought could be achieved by a low-level attack. It was
believed that “the defenses, primed for high-altitude attack, would be confused and
inefficient. There would be little danger from heavy flak and the surprise from a lowlevel attack might render ineffective a large proportion of enemy ground and air defenses
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such as light flak, fighters, balloons, and smoke-pots.”171A study of RAF wartime
experience would have provided a much needed insight for both Smart and Brereton.172
For example, during a mission against German shipping at Schillig Roads on December
14, 1939, British aircrews experienced the low-level accuracy of anti-aircraft fire. “Poor
weather forced the aircraft down at times to as low as 200 feet. The formation then came
under coordinated attack from anti-aircraft fire and German fighters and lost five aircraft.
The RAF ascribed these losses to anti-aircraft, not to German fighters, and ordered
bombers subsequently to attack their targets from altitudes above 10,000 feet.” 173 By
believing that the defenses would be negated by a low-level attack the Ploesti planners
were carrying on a long tradition of assumption in aerial warfare. “Intelligence firmly
estimated that the flak and detection systems were arraigned in Ploesti‟s eastern
approaches, toward the Soviets, and denied the possibility of effective defenses in the
northern, western, and southern salients of Ploesti.”174Air crews were also told that
barrage balloon cables would not be a problem; the wings of the B-24 would break them.
According to 376th Bombardment Group Captain Jack Preble, “At the briefing they were
told that if they ignored the balloons and knifed right through the cables they would stand
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a good chance of coming through with little damage to their bombers. This Pollyanna
information was greeted with quiet skepticism.”175
The pre-mission assurances of the ineffectiveness of Ploesti‟s defenses did not
convince many of the men that would be flying the mission. In fact, General Uzal Ent,
Brereton‟s Chief of Staff, wrote a very detailed report comparing and contrasting the
high-altitude and low-level attacks based solely on his “personal opinions”. He pointed to
the increased morale inherent in a high-level attack and the fact that the crews had
already been trained in this method; a low level mission would require intensive
retraining. He also pointed to the difficulty of target selection during a low level attack,
the possibility that smoke “could easily cause an abortive mission”, and estimated losses
at “75 A/C or 71% greater than for high level.”176 However, the risk to the crews was
overshadowed by the pressure from on high to strike a single decisive blow against
Ploesti. Ultimately the type of attack to be used was decided upon by Brereton and he
took full responsibility.177 “After receiving the target folders I studied them for two
weeks before making up my mind on the low-level attack. I invited no discussion
whatsoever among the commanders.”178
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On the early morning of August 1, 1943, 178 B-24s179 took off from Benghazi
Libya carrying “500-lb and 1,000-lb demolition bombs totaling 311 tons.”180 The mission
did not unfold as planned. As several detailed narratives of the attack exist there is no
need for an in-depth description here, but there are several aspects that are important to
this study.181As the aircraft crossed Albania they were separated into two distinct groups
due to cloud cover. Radio silence was to be maintained throughout the mission to assist in
achieving surprise. This lack of communication would not only be felt in the clouds over
Albania but also when the lead group mistook the town of Targovisti for its initial point
of Floresti and turned south towards the target too early, putting the 376th and 98th Bomb
Groups on course to bomb Bucharest. Radio silence was finally broken to correct the
mistake. Not only had the force become separated but now two groups would be
approaching from the south/southeast instead of the northwest as briefed. The result over
Ploesti was bombers flying every which way through intense flak that was fully capable
of hitting them.
What is fascinating about the strict order to maintain radio silence which
contributed to the separation and wrong turn is that no element of surprise was ever
achieved by the Americans on August 1, 1943. The utmost secrecy was attempted during
the planning stages of the mission; the crew members were not officially informed of
their target until the night before. Regardless of the strict control of information,
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everyone in the area could tell that something major was underway. The addition of 120
aircraft from England did not go unnoticed by the local population nor did the intense
low-level training in the desert. According to Dugan and Stewart, due to spies in Libya
and the deciphering of the Allied code, “the Germans knew immediately that the force
was up from Benghazi.”182 Was it even possible to conceal a mass of 178 four-engine
bombers? “Between German radio and radar contact, sightings over Bulgaria, and the
spectacle created by the heavy bomber formation motoring over the Danube at extremely
low altitude, the defenders of Ploesti knew that an attack was coming.” 183 It is
incomprehensible that a plan could be executed that relied solely on surprise, which was
not at all achievable, as the primary means to protect the lives of American crewmen.184
How did the pre-mission assumptions hold in action? The defenses exacted a
heavy toil upon the American crews who were sent on a mission that called for the exact
opposite of their aircraft‟s purpose and official training. “Indications are that 90 per cent
of the damage was caused by antiaircraft fire. 20-mm and 37-mm or 40-mm were used
with telling effect. 88-mm guns were fired point-blank with shells bursting within
relatively short distance of the muzzle.”185 In addition to the stationary defenses, the
Germans surprised the attackers with a flak train, the results of which were disastrous due
to the pilots having been instructed to follow the rail line on their approach.186 On the
return trip the survivors were set upon by German fighters resulting in even more losses.
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Several made their way for neutral Turkey, unable to complete the return trip to Libya.
“The price was 53 Liberators, including eight interned in Turkey. The official report said
that 446 airmen were killed or missing, 79 were interned in Turkey, and 54 were
wounded.”187

The 8/1/1943 Balance Sheet
Did the raid achieve a significant return for this investment in blood and material?
The answer is no. Though “airplane for airplane, the attackers on this particular raid
caused more damage than any other subsequent raid against Ploesti,”188 due to the huge
cushion between refining capacity and production the damage did not achieve the desired
results. In fact, “within a few weeks Ploesti was producing at a greater rate than ever
before.”189 An OSS study of the raid concluded that its “major result…is the elimination
of approximately 3.9 million tons of excess refining capacity. The capacity destroyed
represents almost all efficiently located spare refinery capacity in Axis Europe.
Immediate loss of supplies by reason of the Ploesti raid is thought to be
inconsiderable.”190 According to this evaluation, though the 8/1/1943 attack did not in
and of itself reduce the production of Axis petroleum, if followed up with a full-scale
attack upon the oil system the results could have been felt immediately and may have had
a dramatic effect on Germany‟s ability to wage mechanized warfare. Yet none were
187
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made. The Ninth was in no position to continue bombardment operations after the
mauling it received on the first of August. Additional attacks against Ploesti had been
planned but were scrapped soon after the cost of the mission became clear. According to
Brereton, “ACM (Air Chief Marshall) Tedder advised me that he had recommended that
further attacks on Ploesti be postponed in favor of direct support to the coming missions
in Italy.”191 Pressure was not maintained and the limited accomplishments of the August
raid were nullified.
The OSS was not alone in their dim analysis of the 1943 raid. Lt. Col. Forster, in
the first interpretive report of the mission photographs, looked to the bombs used as the
reason for the lack of serious and long-lasting damage. “The evidence indicates that the
aircraft bombed the targets accurately but many of the bombs do not appear to have
exploded, for this reason the damage is not as great as might have been expected.”192
Problems with the bombs themselves would become a serious issue and, according to a
USSBS postwar analysis, reached epidemic proportions. “One in every six bombers sent
on these attacks might just as effectively loaded its bomb bays with scrap iron. Missions
were wasted and lives of airmen lost flying junk to Germany.”193 Forster also addressed
the issue of bomb weight. “As a general indication it is suggested that neither 500-lb nor
1,000-lb (bombs) falling outside the protective blast walls are certain to cause vital
damage, although they may cause very serious secondary damage.”194 It is almost as if
Lambright never wrote his report. Since pinpoint accuracy was not possible, even at low191
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level, larger bombs would have to be used. It is amazing that throughout the subsequent
1944 attacks against Ploesti no bombs larger than 1,000 pounds were ever used by the
USAAF. Regardless of these points Forster still asserts that the mission was a success “in
view of the great distance covered and the difficulties encountered.”195 As with German
flak defenses the definition of success was vital and in this case it became flexible based
on results; the definition changed in the minds of many to the mere fact that the mission
had taken place at all. In the end it is results that are important and the 1943 low-level
raid did not achieve its desired effect, hence it cannot be considered successful. “It is
therefore concluded that there will be no ultimate loss of products except such stocks as
were actually destroyed during the raid.”196
What did the Germans think of this daring low-level raid? Did they feel it was
successful? According to a Luftwaffe report, “a repetition of this type of attack should by
no means be expected, as the B-24 proved insufficient in a flak protected area and the
light flak proved to be considerably more effective than was expected.”197 The Germans
clearly recognized the toll their defenses had taken on the presumptuous attackers, and
the inability to repeat the attack was taken as a defensive victory.
The British proposed an attack on Ploesti to maintain pressure on oil production.
In a telegram dated November 1, 1943, they brought up the possibility of contributing to
the attacks on Ploesti in their own unique way:
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As you may not be able to make further heavy day attack on Ploesti in
immediate future consider that an attack by Wellingtons on Ploesti town
might have beneficial effect. Refinery workers who live in badly built and
flimsy houses in that town would thus be exposed to temperatures of the
order of minus twenty degrees centigrade with obvious results on their
work. A few blockbusters might therefore achieve a very substantial effect
and keep the pot boiling until you are in a position to do a day raid on
refineries.198

Though this offer was not accepted by the USAAF, it is comforting to know that the
British were willing to “do their part” during this phase of the Ploesti campaign.
With the amount of excess capacity and an obvious inability to achieve the much
necessary element of surprise, why was such an attack launched? There is the very real
issue of momentum to consider. Just shy of 80,000 aircraft were produced and
approximately 2,400,000 personnel trained for the Army Air Force to achieve its
objectives during the course of World War Two.199 Such a force required that some
action be taken to justify its creation, political leaders and the public expected as much.
This concept was perfectly expressed by General Anderson after the war when he was
asked to describe the reasoning behind August 1st, 1943:
There wasn‟t any. No Sir. It was all: we‟ve got a program, we‟ve got to
run it; we‟ve got a force, we‟ve got to use it. The same reason why we did
our airborne operation in Orne: we‟ve got some airborne forces, goddam
it; we‟ve got to use them, to justify the building of them.200
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General Anderson also disapproved of any mission against Ploesti taking place after the
summer of 1942, claiming that once the German advance into Russia had been halted
Ploesti lost much of its strategic importance.201 This need to use the tools that have been
developed, regardless of whether or not they fit the role demanded of them, would not be
limited to World War II; it continued throughout the second half of the twentieth century
and into the present. B-52s over Vietnam are a prime example, as are unarmored
Humvees patrolling the streets of Baghdad.
Though the 1943 raid on Ploesti did not achieve its stated goals, it was incredibly
useful as a propaganda tool. The USAAF skillfully diverted attention from the strategic
and tactical failures of this venture and instead focused the public light on the courage
and valor of American air crews. Like Custer‟s Last Stand and the British retreat at
Dunkirk, manipulation of public perception turned a grim situation into one of benefit.
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Unlike the HALPRO mission, the raid made the next day‟s headline in the New
York Times and was praised as an action that “may materially affect the course of the
war.”203 Though claiming that Ploesti produced “90 per cent of the German Air Force‟s
gasoline”, which was demonstrably false, the New York Times correctly stated the
number of aircraft involved and the fact that they were all B-24s. The paper took a much
more analytical tone on August 3rd, recognizing that the complete destruction of Ploesti
would not force Germany out of the war but would limit her abilities on the Eastern
Front.204
As we have seen, the first two visits to Ploesti by the USAAF were fundamentally
different from the doctrine developed at ACTS. Almost a year had passed between the
two, negating the concept of repeated attacks to maintain pressure upon the target. The
HALPRO raid was flown at mid-altitude with an incredibly small force that attacked
targets randomly. The famous raid of 1943 was extraordinarily micromanaged, but the
realities of warfare and the element of chance negated this preponderance of planning.
The disregarding of one doctrinal pillar (high-altitude bombardment) resulted in the
adoption of a false assumption, that low-altitude would provide surprise. While the 1944
operations against Ploesti would more closely resemble the doctrine taught at the Air
Corp Tactical School, air planners were not yet finished experimenting with ways to
address both the inability of their equipment to live up to their expectations and the
impressive defenses amassed around this Romanian town.
203
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Chapter 5: Trying to Force Doctrine into Reality
Though the planned follow-up missions after August 1, 1943 did not occur, the
obsession with Ploesti remained with USAAF leaders. Spaatz was still focused on the
destruction of Germany‟s oil supply
and America‟s return to Ploesti was
not a question of if but of when.205
With the capture of Southern Italy
the Allies occupied a base of
operations

that

allowed

for

penetrations into Southern Germany,
the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The
area around Foggia, Italy was turned
into a giant air base and became the
operational center of the Fifteenth
Air Force which had been activated
206

205

on November 11, 1943 under
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General Doolittle. When Doolittle was transferred to the Eighth Air Force, General
Nathan F. Twining was put in command of the Fifteenth. By June 15, 1944 the Fifteenth
Air Force was comprised of five bomb wings, the 5th, 47th, 49th, 55th and the 304th,
divided into 21 bomb groups. This massive bombing force was protected by the 306th
Fighter Wing which utilized Lockheed P-38s, North American P-51s, and Republic P47s.207
The question once again became how to effectively use this force. Spaatz and
other oil enthusiasts did not find a champion within the Committee of Operations
Analysts. In a report reexamining the crude oil situation, the COA determined that, “in its
judgment, although the events of the past year have increased the target importance of
crude oil refineries, they should not be given a higher target priority.” 208 This
recommendation was due to the belief that it would require six months for the Germans
to use their currents stocks, only then would the attacks have an effect upon enemy
actions in the field. Even then, the paralyzing effect of an increased attack on oil was by
no means certain in the eyes of the members of the COA. It was estimated that
production could only be cut by 2,750,000 tons through an oil offensive, and that “a
reduction of this order would mean curtailment and not collapse.”209 Oil‟s importance as
a target whose destruction would end the war was by no means certain nor agreed upon,
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but it continued to be a quixotic vision to those that wished to bring into reality the
doctrine developed during the interwar years. The struggle over bombing priorities
among Allied leaders continued throughout the spring of 1944. With the planned invasion
of Europe on the table Eisenhower tended to side with Tedder over the immediate use of
airpower and transportation targets were given top priority.210

Blurring the Lines
A mission-by-mission breakdown of the 21 attacks that made up the 1944
campaign against Ploesti (18 by the USAAF, 3 by the RAF) is neither necessary nor
desired for our purposes, but there are some aspects of these missions that require further
discussion.211 On April 5, 1944, as part of the new campaign against transportation, the
Fifteenth Air Force sent a force to Ploesti to attack the large marshalling yards south of
the city. There appears to be some subterfuge on behalf of the USAAF to circumvent the
British-backed transportation priority and the nearby refineries were intentionally hit
along with the rail yards. 212 An addendum to the 376th Bomb Group‟s strike report for
this date also makes mention that “several clusters (of bombs were) far over and to left in
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city area.”213 The 301st Bomb Group report discusses a similar instance, with the city area
taking hits due to the bombs falling short and to the left of the target.214 What is important
about these occurrences is that, though there was fierce fighter and flak cover, there was
no report of a smoke screen in operation during this raid. What would the toll be upon the
city as the smoke screen became a vital component in the defense of the refineries? 444.5
tons worth of 500 lb general purpose bombs and 144.2 tons of incendiaries were dropped
by 95 B-17s and 136 B-24s on this first raid by the Fifteenth Air Force.215 The USAAF
would rarely use incendiaries at Ploesti and the general purpose bomb, in the 500 lb and
1,000 lb varieties, became the standard package. Air planners had learned at least one
lesson from August 1943 and no heavy bomber attack against Ploesti during 1944 would
be below 19,000 feet.
The two return trips in April, on the 15th and the 24th, would continue to officially
target the marshalling yards, but the bombing „accidently‟ struck oil targets as well. In
this case the inability to achieve true precision appears to have benefited Spaatz and likeminded USAAF leaders. The Intelligence Operations (INTOPS) report for April 24th
brings to the surface some interesting questions. It states that there were three primary
targets that day, the south, east, and north marshalling yards. Due to „smoke‟ over the
east and north marshalling yards the 70 aircraft of the 449th and 450th Bomb Groups
assigned to the east and the 39 from the 376th that were to attack the north all assisted the
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204 aircraft attacking the south marshalling yard. Due to the inherent nature of strategic
bombardment at the time the bomb strings „accidentally‟ entered the Astra Romana
refinery.216 After reading this report one cannot help but get the impression that this
mission was in reality an attack upon Astra Romana. As the following table illustrates,
these „transportation‟ attacks in April somehow succeeded in cutting into oil production,
but the damage was by no means permanent.
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On May 5th the Fifteenth launched a total of 523 aircraft to officially attack the
Ploesti marshalling yards and pumping station, 93% of which (486) would drop their
bombs (somewhat) over the target.218 This was Leroy Newby‟s first mission to Ploesti
with the 460th Bomb Group as the bombardier aboard the Hanger Queen. He claims their
target was not the marshalling yards as listed in the INTOPS Report but rather Xenia
refinery, where they were to attack the “tank farms and nearby distillation unit.”219 The
flak was listed as “very intense, accurate, heavy.”220 This would become a familiar phrase
in the INTOPS reports to come. Not much had changed since the time of AWPD/1 as far
as the bomber crew‟s defense against flak was concerned. “Our instructions were very
clear. Fly into and through the box of flak.”221 The defenses of Ploesti were so great and
the suggested responses to them so blatantly ridiculous that seven aircraft were lost to
flak and 132 of the 486 aircraft over the target were hit by it, a whopping 21 percent of
the total.222 Once again, 500 lb bombs were used. All following missions list refineries as
primary targets due to a compromise between the transportation and oil factions. In fact,
on June 8, 1944 Spaatz was secure enough in his position to issue an order to all air
forces in theater “that their primary strategic aim henceforth would be to deny oil to the
enemy‟s armed forces.”223
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This order may have marked the official change, but there is telling evidence that
an active concealment took place up to this point in the skies over Ploesti. According to
the May 5th INTOPS report, the 304th Bomb Wing was to attack the north marshalling
yards. As the following photograph indicates, they dropped their load to the south of the
marshalling yards, in the northeastern section of the town.
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While this in itself is cause for concern, what is even more so is the fact that the
Concordia Vega refinery is used as the aiming point to judge the accuracy of the mission.
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If the crews were to be held to this aiming point as the standard that would determine
whether their mission was successful then they had to have been told so. If this is the case
then the INTOPS report writer was either grossly misinformed or there was something
very wrong.
There is also a discrepancy between the MASAF (Mediterranean Allied Strategic
Air Force) INTOPS report from the May 31 raid and the reports of the 376th and 449th
Bomb Groups. According to the theater-level report, the two groups, both elements of the
47th Bomb Wing, had the Romana Americana refinery as their primary target. 225 Both of
the group-level reports list the city itself as their target, with the 449th even listing its
aiming point as the “center of city.”226 Whether this was the briefed target or the point
where the bombs were released due to smoke cover and enemy opposition is unclear.
Newby discusses at length the effect of smoke cover on this particular mission.227 “I
couldn‟t see the target, let alone the aiming point. It was a helpless feeling to relocate my
hairs on a nebulous section of white nothing, hoping my target would somehow be at that
spot.”228 Someone must have hit something because as shown by the MASAF
Intelligence Section‟s statistical data on page 85, the May 31 raid had a profound impact
upon production at Ploesti.
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The Struggle against the Defenses
June was the month of the smoke screen. The effectiveness of this passive defense
once again depends on ones definition of success, but if frustrating the efforts of the
American bomb crews is to be the standard then it was highly successful. Trying to bomb
visually on June 6 must have been a nightmare, flying through flak to drop bombs into a
sea of fluff. It is hard to justify putting one‟s life on the line if you are unable to evaluate
the outcome. The day‟s INTOPS Summary results section is riddled with variations of the
phrase “heavily obscured by smoke pots making bomb strike assessment impossible.”229
Col. Barr, deputy Air Chief of Staff, A-2, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff,
recommended two ways to overcome the highly effective smoke screen at Ploesti. The
first was to utilize dive bombing, and the second was the use of P.F.F. (PathFinder Force,
or radar-assisted „H2X‟ bombing).230 On June 10 seventy-five Lockheed P-38
„Lightnings‟ were launched against Ploesti, thirty-six carrying a single 1,000 lb bomb to
be used in a dive-bombing attack on Romana Americana with the rest providing fighter
escort. Even more so than the attack of August 1, 1943, this went completely contrary to
accepted doctrine and is in effect an admission that it was not working against such a
heavily defended target as Ploesti. A total of twenty-three P-38s were lost, almost 31% of
the force.231 The next attack on June 24 against Romana Americana by B-24s would
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again be thwarted by a highly effective smoke screen resulting in an almost wasted
mission. “Post raid recon shows heavy concentrations of strike on all sides of the
refinery, but only a few scattered hits inside the plant causing only negligible damage.”232
High-altitude heavy bomber attacks continued throughout July and August as the
Fifteenth struggled to overcome the defenses of Ploesti. The attack of July 9th utilized
every means available at the time in an attempt to put the bombs on target. Against Xenia
the 2nd and the 463rd Bomb Groups were able to bomb visually but the 97th, 99th and 483rd
had to resort to PFF assistance “due to the smoke screen over the target.” 233 It is
interesting to note that in a raid lasting nine minutes that 40% of the attacking force could
see the target and utilize the more effective method of visual bombing. The attack on
Concordia Vega by the 98th, 376th, 449th and 450th Bomb Groups was executed utilizing a
mixture of visual bombing, offset, PFF and synchronous methods.234 The results were
unknown due to the mission photos being concealed by smoke. Almost the entire attack
of July 15 was executed with PFF methods.235 Though radar-assistance had been used
against Ploesti to some extent since the beginning of the Fifteenth‟s operations, its use
would increase throughout the summer of 1944. As illustrated by the table on page 85 the
effectiveness of the bombing missions decreased substantially over those that relied more
upon visual methods during the spring. “The accuracy obtained with H2X through 10/10
232
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clouds is .02 per cent of the bombs within 1,000 feet of the aiming point as compared
with 30 per cent dropped under visual conditions.”236 How could precision targets,
protected from all but direct hits, be effectively attacked under these circumstances?
Such methods inevitably resulted in bombs hitting places other than their desired
industrial targets. Dugan and Stewart discuss the negative view that the Romanian people
had for the “Italians”, those bombing from Italy in 1944, due to the inaccuracy of their
methods and the casualties that resulted.237 To counter this public perception the Allies
launched a parallel „bombing‟ mission which showered the Romanians with leaflets
referred to as nickels. These placed the blame for the destruction squarely on the German
smoke screen and called on the Romanians to do everything within their power to destroy
and sabotage the generators. 238 This assumes that if it were not for this passive defense
system only industrial and military targets would be on the receiving end of the bombs.
The amazing thing about the smoke screen is that there were ways to counteract it
but the American propensity to cling to regimented, predictable order greatly assisted the
defenders. The post-campaign interrogation of Colonel Rudieanu, a Romanian officer
who assisted in overseeing flak defenses at Ploesti, by Lt. R.H. Dorr bears this out. The
smoke was of limited duration, having only about a three hour window of effectiveness.
“If American planes had attacked in waves over a period of 5 hours, it would, according
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to Colonel Rudieanu, have been impossible to replace the used smoke barrels fast enough
to maintain the screen; and the last groups would have been able to see the target.”239
Not only was the smoke screen a defensive measure that could have been
overcome by adjusting procedure, but the effectiveness of flak defenses could have been
reduced as well. Appendix Two contains a diagram of the flak defenses over Ploesti and
provides an idea of the interlocking hail of shrapnel that would greet the approaching
bombers. Attacks from the northeast, southeast, and southwest were under continuous fire
for around three minutes, while attacks made from the northwest were “held under fire
for over four minutes.”240 With 256 anti-aircraft guns of 88-mm size or larger beginning
their defensive fire at 12,000 yards out Ploesti was a formidable and dangerous target. 241
Multiple approaches during a small time period at various altitudes could have divided
the defenses, diluting their effectiveness.
Returning over and over again to such a heavily defended area took its toll on the
bomb crews. When writing about the August 17th raid, Captain Jack Preble of the 376th
Bomb Group described the mission as “another tiresome and dangerous Ploesti raid.”242
Again, one cannot help but think of the plight of Yossarian in Joseph Heller‟s novel.
Newby makes mention of the insanity of it all when he discusses the route to Belgrade.
They were told to fly on a straight path to the target, even though that took them over
four flak guns at Mostar which never failed to shoot at them. When this fact was brought
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to the attention of their commanders they were told they had to continue taking this route
to conserve fuel.243 Aviation fuel was apparently more important than lives to the United
States though it possessed the resource in abundance.

And the Credit Goes to…
The three days of August 17, 18, and 19 would be the last that the Fifteenth would
see of Ploesti. 1,320.5 tons of 500 lb. bombs were dropped over these three days through
a still highly effective smoke screen by a mixture of visual, offset and synchronous
PFF.244 The historical literature either alludes to or simply comes out and claims that it
was the bombing by the Allies that shut down production at Ploesti, but is this truly the
case?245 If we refer back to the table on page 85 we see a cycle of bombing and repair,
and in fact this cycle begins anew after the raid of August 19th. There was something else
vastly more important taking place in August 1944 than just another series of USAAF
raids. This was the advancing Red Army, which entered Ploesti on August 30th. Would it
make any sense for the Germans to repair the refineries only to leave a functioning
Ploesti for the Soviets? While the three day attack dropped a massive amount of tonnage
upon Ploesti there was nothing different in the methods or bombs used from previous
missions during the summer. It seems rather too coincidental and convenient that the
243
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Allies would get it right just before the Russian capture of the city, though this is the
picture painted in the popular narrative.

Evaluating the Campaign
The entire American campaign against the oil refineries of Ploesti Romania came
at a rather high price. “At the end Gerstenberg‟s bill was 286 U.S. heavy bombers and
2,829 men killed or captured.”246 Was it worth the cost? Though Ploesti was not available
for study by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey several of its reports are of
value in answering this question and, more importantly, an OSS mission was allowed into
Ploesti to conduct its own analysis immediately after its surrender to the Soviets.247 It is
from these sources that we can piece together an understanding of the Ploesti operation
and use that conclusion to determine the overall effectiveness of prewar doctrine.
Captain W.A. Salant, a member of the R&A Intelligence group sent to Ploesti,
wrote a rather interesting report. According to the information he found on site, the 1943
raid was the most successful when comparing bomb tonnage dropped to capacity denied
the enemy. His overall conclusion of the 1944 campaign is striking due to the inclusion of
a counterfactual to bolster the effort:
Although a heavy weight of attack was directed against Ploesti between
April and August, refinery activity in July and August was just as high as
it had been in April, May and June. This does not mean that, if Rumania
had continued in the war, the same weight of attack would have been
required to hold action down to the 40% level. The August attacks left
Ploesti in a highly vulnerable position. All but one of the larger refineries
were incapable of any substantial production for some weeks or months.
246
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The single exception, Astra Romana, accounted for considerably more
than half of the potential production of the next month. One successful
attack on it and Standard, comparable with the successful August raids on
other installations, would have knocked production down to 15% of the
base level for a substantial period.248
Repair estimates based on photographic analysis left much to be desired.249
Questionable conclusions in turn dictated the type, frequency, and targets of the missions
flown. Repairs were made quickly due to the many refinery installations in such a close
area which allowed for the moving around of parts to maintain production. In an
interview with the Romanian Secretary General in charge of fuel, a Mr. Andonie, it was
discovered that after a mere five days of continuous repairs in September 1944
production was expected to reach 2070 ton per day, 7420 after ten days, and 8570 tons
after twenty days.250 The USSBS Physical Damage Report would second this
discrepancy, pointing out that building damage did not always equal a reduction in
production.251 Lieutenants Clark and Rutenberg, themselves photographic interpreters,
were dispatched to Romania and toured seven refineries between September 23 and
October 4. The recommendations based on their observations are very telling. They state
that photo interpreters in the future should be provided the weight and fusing of bombs
used as well as have a “good knowledge of bombs (size and fusing used for particular
248
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installations; what a bomb of a given weight and fusing is expected to do; blast and shock
effects; ect.).”252 One would expect that these would have already been a vital part of
photo interpretation training, and the fact that their inclusion was being recommended in
October 1944 is surprising.
As we have already seen there was much discussion pertaining to the use of large
bombs to effectively damage the protected vital parts of the refineries, and after the fall of
Ploesti we have more of the same. “Inspection of damage at Astra Romana suggests that
bomb sizes and fusings have not been optimum.”253 Larger bombs were vital to achieve
the desired results and yet no change in bomb type occurred throughout the entirety of the
USAAF Ploesti campaign. Only during R.A.F. night raids were the recommended sizes
used. Who was responsible for making these recommendations reality?
One reason for a lack of change in bomb size could be the American reliance on
probability. If an aircraft can only hold one 4,000 lb bomb or eight 500 lb bombs, and
you are basing your entire strategy on the chance that at least one bomb must hit
something, than the 500 lb load is more conducive to achieving such a hit. Whether or not
that hit actually results in enough damage to effect production is secondary. This belief
finds its roots with interwar planners, who argued that any direct hit from a 500 lb or
1,000 lb bomb would destroy a target. Photo interpretation helped to reinforce this notion.
Only after physical examination of the refineries could the truth be known. “An
optimistic estimate is that 5 percent of the bombs which were dispatched to industrial
252
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targets caused either structural or superficial damage.”254 This could easily have been
discovered if practice raids against refinery installations under something even remotely
resembling wartime conditions had taken place within the United States at some period
before actual operations. Bomb size and fusing explains the inability of hits and nearmisses to produce the desired destruction, but this only helps to understand those few that
actually made it close to their intended target. What of all those that did not?
Getting bombs to hit their targets
was crucial and, as was discussed in
chapter one, air planners between the
wars believed they had solved this
problem by dropping as many bombs as
possible at the target hoping that one
would result in its destruction. This led to
the belief that the more bombers the
better. The reality of wartime experience
would tell a different story. “Two of the
most important factors affecting accuracy
255

254

are altitude of attack and size of the

United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Physical Damage Division Report. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
GPO, 1947), 7.
255
United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in
the ETO. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1947), Exhibit F.

Seyer, Sean, 2009, UMSL, p.98

attacking force.”256 Altitude was necessary during daylight due to ground defenses, a
large attacking force was required to achieve the required probability of hits, and massive
formations were necessary for protection against German fighters. Unfortunately these
formations had a negative effect on accuracy at the target.
The Bomb Groups attacking Ploesti not only had to deal with the difficulties of
accuracy inherent in the system, but also those brought about by their target. “Of the 10
target complexes analyzed, the two which proved most difficult to bomb accurately were
synthetic oil and oil refineries.”257 While studying synthetic plants in Western Europe, the
USSBS Oil Division found that only 12.9% of the bombs dropped fell within the fences
of the plants, and only 3% of the total dropped hit any structures or equipment at all.258
Visual bombing was more or less useless over Ploesti due to the smoke screen and
reliance on PFF and offset did not increase accuracy. “During six attacks, 37 groups
which used these methods dropped 11,988 bombs on their briefed targets whereas
refinery records reveal only 40 bombs landed within the target areas. This is an accuracy
of 3.66%.”259 Since they had to return until the job was done to the satisfaction of their
superiors, it is easy to see why the men flying these missions dreaded hearing that this
Romanian town was their target that day.
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Conclusion: A Matter of Perception?
There is much to be learned from the study of the Ploesti raids. The first and most
important is that real-world situations will require flexibility and this is most easily
acquired if some level of adaptability is built into the plan before operations begin. The
concept developed must be fluid enough to be effective once it is outside of the
laboratory that created it. 260 Though the practical application of any theory does have an
element of chance that influences the outcome, there is much that can be done to limit the
effects of the unknown. At Ploesti the USAAF grabbed on to a few novel ideas but did
not properly and thoroughly evaluate its operating procedure. Though technology may
develop rapidly, fresh ways of thinking take longer to materialize.
New targeting technologies were adopted due to the effectiveness of the German
defenses, but the bureaucratic nature of the USAAF contributed to its difficulties over
Ploesti. The flak defenses were static; it was beholden to the attackers to find ways to
minimize their effectiveness. The main advantage of an aircraft is its freedom of
movement. The inability of American planners to properly utilize this characteristic is a
glaring fault that would continue in future operations, most notably in Vietnam. The
following, listing the standard operating procedures which assisted the enemy based on
interviews with the defenders, shows a lack of inventiveness that can also be found in
conflicts throughout the latter half of the twentieth century:
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1. Altitudes of attack were from 6000 to 8000 metres.
2. Attacks so close to schedule defenders never worried before 10 o‟clock
in the morning or after 3 o‟clock in the afternoon.
3. After passing the I.P. a long straight bomb run to targets were made
with no feints, evasive action or deviation.
4. After first attacks in April it became evident that one of about five well
defended ground areas were being used for the I.P.
5. A standardized approach and departure system which, after two or three
raids, was completely predicable because it was unvaried.
6. Speed was within a few miles-per-hours of the average of first four
attacks.
7. Attacks were made when weather conditions and clouds were favorable
to our defenses and optical range finding.261

It is rather amazing that such creativity could be harnessed to facilitate doctrinal
development before the war yet once operations commenced bureaucratic rigidity and
predictability took its place.
Regardless of the effectiveness of the bombs used and the accuracy of the
bombing, reductions in crude oil production at Ploesti were made. The ultimate question
then must address whether the bombing campaign was a success. When held to the
standard championed by those at ACTS and the developers of AWPD/1 the answer must
be no. It was believed that high-altitude bombing could destroy the enemy‟s ability to
wage war and thus force them to sue for peace. This did not happen as a result of the
bombing campaign against Ploesti, against oil, or even in the overall Combined Bomber
Offensive. The oil campaign is seen by historians as the greatest strategic contribution
made by the USAAF in World War Two. As we have seen, the fundamentals of the
German economy were based upon coal and not oil. Therefore the major contribution of
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the oil campaign was the grounding to a halt of that small mechanized portion of the
German military machine. This effect was most pronounced upon the Luftwaffe, which
simply could not operate without aviation grade gasoline. “No one can doubt that the oil
offensive was extremely effective in reducing the combat power of the Wehrmacht and
especially the Luftwaffe. Nor can it be doubted that it exerted no influence on the
operations of German industry.”262 The greatest achievement of the USAAF during
World War Two was completely separate from the vision which it had promoted. It is
ironic that the main effect of the oil campaign was against the enemy air force; by
strategic action the USAAF accomplished the same anti-air role it had originally been
pigeonholed into which had resulted in its „rebellion‟ and turn to strategic doctrine.
Curiously, the USAAF found a champion in General Eisenhower if they were
willing to modify their definition of success. Being an Army man Eisenhower had a
different opinion of the effective use of air power, he believed it “did not destroy – it
damaged.”263 He recognized a definite usefulness in the steady depletion and erosion of
the enemy‟s abilities through bombardment. He saw airpower as a means to sow
confusion and cause difficulty in supply and production for the enemy, but it was the job
of the ground forces to successfully and completely deny them resources. This view was
the antithesis of an independent air force controlled by airmen, something so desperately
desired by the leadership of the USAAF. A consensus on the definition of success is as
important as the actual operation itself. We see this played out in Korea, Vietnam, and
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Iraq. A definition of victory must be agreed upon by both the political and military
leadership and the public at the earliest opportunity.
In reference to the American bombing campaign against the German economy,
Albert Speer wrote, “The idea was correct, the execution defective.”264 In this he was
partially correct. Hopefully this study has demonstrated that, though based on solid
theory, the doctrine developed prior to World War II was influenced by the projected
reality in which it was developed; a bubble of intellectual reasoning, presumption, and
assumption that turned out to be very different from the conditions faced in wartime.
These preconceived notions resulted in fundamental misunderstandings by Allied war
planners, and the expected results of bombing that many believed and preached caused a
disconnect between decision makers and the reality on the ground. Due to bureaucratic
rigidness and strict adherence to ideology, many of the lessons learned through combat
operation over Ploesti were not promptly or effectively implemented. The results of such
a divide between the perceived uses of new technology and its actual effects were waste,
confusion, disappointment, prolonged suffering, and unnecessary deaths on both sides of
the conflict. These aspects become clearly visible when one takes an overall view of the
Ploesti campaign.
Driven by a desire to prove their beliefs correct, both to achieve victory and to
insure an independent Air Force after the war, American air planners attempted to force
their vision into being beyond the point required to admit reality. Due to a
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misunderstanding of the fundamentals underlying their enemy they repeatedly attempted
to achieve their goals while continuously compromising the doctrine they had so
painfully developed, nurtured and protected. Ploesti is a prime example of the circular
nature of bureaucratic systems. A bureaucracy will perpetuate the belief that established
it, even past the point when it has been proven incorrect or invalid. As Freeman Dyson so
eloquently stated, “The responsibility for criticizing and controlling military policies
belongs to the political authorities of each country.”265 In a representative government, it
is beholden upon the voting populace to expect and demand constant vigilance from their
representatives. Those in positions of power, along with the citizenry, must demand that
ineffective ideas and practices be discarded for new ones based in reality.
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Appendix 1

ROMANIA IN FOG
As you have seen, the German fog cannot prevent the destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti

BUT
ROMANIAN LIVES CAN STILL BE SAVED, IF YOU KNOW HOW TO IMPOSE AN END TO THIS KIND
OF CAMOUFLAGE.
Also the fog of the German lies, made up specially to keep Romania at war, cannot prevent the United
Nations smashing any resistance on Romanian land.

BUT
Hundreds of thousands of Romanian lives can still be saved, if you can impose the ending of the policy
of sacrifice of Romania for Germany.
THE FATE OF YOUR COUNTRY LIES IN YOUR HANDS. REMOVE THE GERMAN FOG.
Dropped by the British Royal Air Force
266
and the United States Army Air Force
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An example of a „nickel‟ dropped on the Ploesti area. Note tha it places the blame for the death of
civilians and the destruction of their homes squarely upon the German smoke screen.
http://natureonline.com/37/16-op6.html. Accessed 1/15/2009.
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Appendix 2
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“Flak Intelligence from Ploesti: Preliminary Report by AC/AS, Intelligence.” December 2, 1944.
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attacking aircraft were still 12,000 yards out from their targets.
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Appendix 3
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